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This thesis analyzes regulation, competition and consumer decisions in three distinct
platform markets. Chapter 1 studies competition between internet service providers
and the interconnection of Content-Delivery-Networks in the light of the net neutrality
debate. The results suggest that a departure from a regime of strict net neutrality is
associated with efficiency gains. Content-delivery-networks lead to higher incentives
for investment on the one hand, however, soften competition for consumers on the
other hand. Chapter 2 analyzes competition between ad-based online platforms and
platforms’ incentives to collect user data. The model predicts a market failure in
this type of environment as the level of data collection in the market equilibrium
is inefficient. This result provides a justification for privacy regulation as well as
competition policy measures, while the market failure can also be counteracted by
establishing a market for personal data. Chapter 3 analyzes crowdfunding platforms
as a means to collect funds in light of aggregate demand uncertainty. The results
suggest that demand in crowdfunding campaigns is strategically withheld in order
to counteract future price changes which implies a limited ability of crowdfunding
campaigns to reduce demand uncertainty.
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit Regulierung, Wettbewerb und
Konsumentenverhalten in drei unterschiedlichen Plattformmärkten. Kapitel 1
analysiert den Wettbewerb zwischen Netzanbietern und die Zwischenschaltung
von Content-Delivery-Networks im Rahmen der Netzneutralitätsdebatte. Die
Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass eine Abkehr vom Prinzip der strikten Netzneutralität
mit Effizienzgewinnen verbunden ist. Content-Delivery-Networks schaffen dabei
einerseits zusätzliche Investitionsanreize für Netzanbieter, andererseits reduzieren sie
die Intensität des Wettbewerbs um Endnutzer. Kapitel 2 analysiert den Wettbewerb
zwischen werbefinanzierten Online-Plattformen und deren Anreize Nutzerdaten
zu sammeln. Die modelltheoretische Analyse legt dar, dass derartige Märkte zu
einem Marktversagen neigen, da im Marktgleichgewicht eine ineffiziente Menge an
persönlichen Daten gesammelt wird. Dieses Ergebnis rechtfertig Regulierungen im
Datenschutzbereich und den Einsatz wettbewerbspolitischer Maßnahmen, wobei
dem Marktversagen auch durch die Schaffung eines Marktes für Nutzerdaten
entgegengewirkt werden kann. Kapitel 3 analysiert Crowdfunding-Plattformen als
Finanzierungsquelle bei unsicherer Gesamtnachfrage. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass
die Nachfrage in Crowdfunding-Kampagnen strategisch reduziert wird um künftigen
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Preisänderungen entgegenzuwirken. Dies impliziert, dass Crowdfunding-kampagnen
nur bedingt geeignet sind um Nachfrageunsicherheit zu reduzieren.
1Introduction
This thesis analyzes economic interactions on platform markets, which are commonly
defined as markets where an intermediary (the platform) facilitates interaction
between distinct market sides.1 Platforms nowadays span almost every aspect of
public and private life, from communications to grocery shopping, and from dating
to political decision making. Unsurprisingly, platforms are also subject to a heated
debate among politicians and regulators. The business model of Facebook has been
heavily criticized after revelations to what extent the company shares user data
with third parties. Alphabet, the parent company of Google, has been fined record
sums based on antitrust allegations by the European Commission and faces ongoing
investigations in the US. The ‘net neutrality’ debate has led to regulatory changes
in the EU and turned into a partisan issue within the US political system. However,
one would be misled to think that platforms are restricted to online business models.
In fact, the definition only requires the facilitation of interaction between market
sides, such that also brick-and-mortar business models can be platform based (e.g.
a trade fair matching businesses with clients), infrastructure (e.g. internet service
providers connecting content providers to households) or economic institutions in
a broader sense (e.g. technological standards encouraging product development for
end-users).
The peculiarities of platform markets (direct and indirect network effects, switching
costs, potential for natural monopolies, etc.) often challenge standard economic
theory and make it difficult to draw implications for policy and regulation. The
aim of this thesis is therefore to broaden the understanding of platform markets and
to provide insights into mechanisms and dynamics at work. The thesis analyzes three
distinct platform markets from the perspective of microeconomic theory. The first
chapter considers internet service providers as platforms, providing the infrastructure
to connect content providers to consumers. The second chapter considers the role of
online media platforms, which attract consumers and advertisers, and obtain revenue
by facilitating a match between the two. The third chapter considers crowdfunding
platforms which provide a financing source for entrepreneurs by providing access to
potential project backers.
1The definition roughly follows Rysman (2009). Platform markets are also commonly referred to
as being two-sided or multi-sided in their nature, where the sides refer to the distinct market sides
which are brought together by the platform. See e.g. Hagiu and Wright (2015) for an alternative
definition.
2 Introduction
The aim of the first chapter is to contribute on the ongoing debate on ‘net neutrality’
with a particular focus on the question whether internet service providers should
be allowed to offer differentiated service qualities or stick to a single quality level
(net neutrality). This regime choice is of particular interest as it affects not only
the static efficiency in the market for given network capacities, but also long-term
incentives for investment into network infrastructure. The chapter introduces a
model of platform competition between internet service providers, where consumers
demand heterogeneous online content within two quality regimes: net neutrality and
paid prioritization. One key insight is that paid prioritization increases the static
efficiency compared to a neutral network. The model also allows for the analysis of
paid prioritization intermediated by third-party providers, so-called Content Delivery
Networks (CDNs). While the use of CDNs is welfare neutral, it results in higher
consumer prices for internet access. Regarding incentives to invest in network
capacity, the model suggests that quality differentiation leads to higher investments
than a regime of net neutrality, as long as capacity is scarce, while investment is
highest in the presence of CDNs.
The second chapter analyzes competition between online platforms whose business
model relies on the collection and processing of user data. This is analyzed within
a competition framework, where platforms sell targeted advertising (monetary) and
collect user data (non-monetary) to improve their targeting capabilities. Considering
that users incur privacy costs, the model predicts that the market equilibrium level of
data provision is distorted compared to an efficient benchmark and can be too high
or too low: if platforms have significant market power, or if targeting benefits are low,
too much private data is collected and vice-versa. Further, the results suggest that
market power on the user or the advertiser market side leads to more data collection,
which implies substitutability between competition policy measures across market
sides. Moreover, the model predicts that if platforms engage in two-sided pricing, i.e.
monetary transfers on both market sides, data provision is efficient, as it allows to
adequately compensate users for their personal data.
Chapter three studies the role of crowdfunding platforms to facilitate the funding and
implementation of an investment project. This is analyzed in a two-period setting,
where an entrepreneur wants to launch a product, but lacks funding to cover the
necessary investment costs. Funds are raised by pre-selling the product in an all-or-
nothing crowdfunding campaign in a market of uncertain size (period 1). Observing
the outcome of the campaign, the entrepreneur optimizes the pricing of the product
and serves the residual demand in a subsequent retail market (period 2). Consumers
face a price risk as they want to secure the product at the lowest possible price
and are therefore hesitant whether to participate in the crowdfunding campaign in
anticipation of future sales. One prediction of the model is that consumers can
be incentivized to participate in the crowdfunding by assuring price stability across
periods, thereby eliminating the price risk. This is achieved by withholding demand
Introduction 3
in the crowdfunding period in a way that induces the entrepreneur to not change
prices in case of a successful campaign. The characterized equilibrium outcome is





and the Impact of CDNs
Based on Baake and Sudaric (2018).
1.1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on ‘net neutrality’ – a concept that
broadly requires that all internet traffic should be treated equally (Wu, 2003). One
central aspect within the debate revolves around differentiation with respect to
Quality-of-Service (QoS), i.e. whether or not all content classes should face identical
service quality within the network. While opponents of net neutrality argue that
QoS differentiation is part of reasonable network management and should therefore
be allowed, if not encouraged, net neutrality proponents argue that this benefits
mainly network providers as it opens up new revenue models, and picks a few winners
amongst the landscape of content providers (CPs). Indeed this ambivalence can be
found e.g. in EU guidelines (EP and Council of the EU, 2015; BEREC, 2016) where a
neutral treatment of internet traffic appears as a central pillar of the new regulation,
while internet service providers (ISPs) may still offer differentiated QoS under certain
conditions.2 While there are various ways of QoS alterations within the management
of a network, we would like to focus on the practice of ‘paid prioritization’ where CPs
pay ISPs directly for prioritization of their content. We also consider the impact
of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai or Limelight. Instead of
contracting with network operators directly, content providers can contract with an
2As long as there is no discrimination within content classes, differentiated QoS measures can be
applied to different content classes if they are considered to be ‘reasonable’. While traffic management
measures can not be put in place based on purely commercial considerations, the guidelines remain
silent on pricing of differentiated QoS in the case they are technologically reasonable. For further
details we refer to BEREC (2016).
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intermediary, the CDN, which then delivers the traffic to the ISPs.3
The purpose of this paper is therefore to analyze how paid prioritization affects,
firstly, the static efficiency for a given network infrastructure, and secondly, the
dynamic efficiency regarding incentives for investment in network capacity. In a
neutral regime ISPs are only allowed to offer one quality level, i.e. all participants
experience potential network congestion to the same extent. In a paid prioritization
regime ISPs can charge CPs for bypassing the network congestion by having access
to a ‘priority lane’. In a CDN environment ISPs offer access to their priority lanes
to CDNs instead, which then resell the access to CPs. This setup reflects the idea
of capacity bottlenecks in the regional or last-mile segment where congestion occurs
because of high consumer demand (e.g. in legacy copper or coaxial networks).
We present a two-sided market model where two symmetric ISPs compete for
consumers and CPs. Consumers are assumed to single-home, i.e. they purchase
internet access only once, while CPs are free to multi-home with respect to their
QoS choice. Content is differentiated with respect to connection quality sensitivity
and quality levels are derived from a M/M/1 queuing system, where the non-priority
quality (‘best-effort’) always remains free of charge, while the priority quality becomes
a possible revenue source.
Using this framework, we show that the two regimes of QoS differentiation are welfare
superior to the neutral regime. As content is differentiated, a tiered quality regime
allocates priority to highly sensitive content classes, while it leaves content classes
with low quality sensitivity in the waiting queue, resulting in a more efficient use
of existing network capacity. In particular we show that from a welfare perspective
it is irrelevant whether this is achieved by direct paid prioritization or through the
use of a CDN. Differences emerge once we take into account strategic effects of the
QoS regimes on competition for consumers. Here we argue that QoS differentiation
makes the consumer market more elastic leading to lower consumer prices in regimes
of QoS differentiation compared to the neutral regime. In particular, under paid
prioritization consumer prices are lowest, as here a price increase on the user market
has an additional negative effect on the CP market, while this is not the case in a CDN
environment. Lastly, we analyze unilateral incentives to increase network capacity
from a symmetric equilibrium perspective and show that as long as network capacity
is scarce, both discriminatory regimes lead to higher investment in network capacity
3CDNs often have direct interconnection points with last-mile networks which can lead to higher
traffic quality when delivering content to consumers. However, this quality improvement is not seen
as a violation of the principle of net neutrality, as all traffic within the last-mile network is continued
to be treated equally, even though from a consumer point of view a quality differentiation takes place.
For example, the Netflix-Comcast dispute was not about offering priority lanes for Netflix’s services,
but rather about Comcast’s decision to demand interconnection charges from CDNs with a large
amount of outgoing data traffic (caused by Netflix). See for example ‘Comcast vs. Netflix: Is this
really about Net neutrality?’ (Retrieved May 17, 2018 from https://www.cnet.com/news/comcast-
vs-netflix-is-this-really-about-net-neutrality).
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than the neutral regime, while investment is highest in the CDN case, irrespective of
the initial capacity level.
1.2 Related literature
From a modeling perspective we build on the literature on competition in two-sided
markets in general and applications in the telecommunications industry in particular.
The general setup follows the competitive bottleneck idea in Armstrong (2006) in the
sense that we consider single-homing consumers and allow for multi-homing on the CP
side. Applications of a two-sided approach to telephone networks (Armstrong, 1998;
Laffont et al., 1998a; Laffont et al., 1998b) and to the internet industry (Laffont et al.,
2003) can also already be found in earlier work. The key difference is that we explicitly
model network congestion and resulting questions of QoS differentiation, while the
early stream of literature largely disregards questions of network quality.
This aspect is analyzed in detail in the younger but growing literature on net
neutrality.4 Hermalin and Katz (2007) compare a neutral network where ISPs are
restricted to offer a single quality level as opposed to a discriminatory regime where
ISPs can offer multiple quality levels to CPs. They conclude with ambiguous welfare
effects: offering a single quality level drives some content types out of the market and
provides an inefficient low quality level for other content types. However, CPs ‘in
the middle’ are likely to benefit from it. Economides and Hermalin (2012) expand on
this result by explicitly modeling bandwidth limits where different qualities could
introduce welfare gains in light of congested networks. Following a similar QoS
approach, Economides and Hermalin (2015) further show that net neutrality leads to
lower investment incentives. Guo and Easley (2016) consider QoS differentiation with
respect to effective bandwidth and demonstrate that net neutrality is beneficial for
content innovation. Another stream of literature tackles the congestion problem using
a queuing approach. Choi and Kim (2010) and Cheng et al. (2011) present a model
where a monopoly ISP offers a prioritization service to two CPs. This framework
is extended by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) to a model with a continuum of
heterogeneous CPs. While Choi and Kim (2010) and Cheng et al. (2011) derive mixed
results regarding welfare and investment incentives, Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012)
show that a discriminatory regime is more efficient and provides higher investment
incentives in the long run. While we follow the same direction in terms of CP
heterogeneity and the use of queuing, our model differs substantially as we consider
platform competition.
This aspect is captured to some extent by Economides and Tåg (2012) and Njoroge
et al. (2013) where platform competition is considered but the congestion issue is
ignored. Choi et al. (2015) present a closely related model in terms of content
4Greenstein et al. (2016) provide an excellent overview over the inherent trade-offs of the net
neutrality debate as well as the associated literature.
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differentiation and analyze how the business model of CPs affects the optimal price-
quality choice of platforms. The key difference is that while we keep the business
model fixed in our model, qualities are endogenous in the sense that they are affected
by congestion. Secondly, in the case of competition the authors consider cooperative
quality choice, while we consider competition in the quality dimension through
the platforms’ pricing strategies. Kourandi et al. (2015) also consider the case of
competing ISPs but focus on the aspect of internet fragmentation when ISPs obtain
exclusivity over content. The work most closely related to our model is the paper
by Bourreau et al. (2015) where competing ISPs offer queuing based prioritization to
differentiated CPs. The main difference from a modeling perspective is how surplus
is generated in the economy, as the authors consider an elastic number of CPs and
interpret the exclusion of CPs as decrease of content variety. In our model consumers’
utility depends on the connection quality of consumed content and not on variety per
se. One could therefore see our modeling setup as a combination of the models
presented in Choi et al. (2015) and Bourreau et al. (2015). Further, we additionally
introduce CDNs as intermediaries which are not considered in any of the previously
mentioned papers.
In general the topic of CDNs has largely been disregarded in the net neutrality debate.
Hosanagar et al. (2008) study the optimal pricing policy of CDNs but do not perform
any welfare comparisons. This is done to some extent in Hau et al. (2011), where
different QoS regimes are analyzed in the market for internet interconnection. The
overall model differs substantially from ours and in particular the authors do not
consider competition between ISPs for consumers, which is a main driver for our
results. Interestingly, however, the authors also find that a CDN shifts rents away
from consumers to ISPs, a result which qualitatively reoccurs in our analysis, although
the underlying mechanics differ. In particular, our results show that CDNs soften
competition for consumers compared to a regime where CPs directly contract with
ISPs.
Our analysis supports the results obtained by Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) and
Bourreau et al. (2015): a discriminatory regime is superior in terms of static efficiency
and tends to provide higher investment in network capacity. At the same time our
work complements the existing literature in terms of the role of CDNs. While total
efficiency is identical to paid prioritization, consumers face higher prices when CDNs
are used. Regarding the ongoing debate on net neutrality our results therefore suggest
that if QoS differentiation is to be allowed (see e.g. recent advances in the US),
direct prioritization agreements between CPs and ISPs should be preferred over the
indirect contracting via CDNs from a (static) consumer perspective, as they lead to




We study different QoS regimes in a two-sided market setting where ISPs deliver
content from CPs on one market side to consumers on the other market side. CPs
strike QoS deals either with ISPs directly (section 1.4.1 and 1.4.2) or with a CDN in
section 1.4.3.
Internet service providers There are two identical ISPs i = 1, 2 located at the
ends of a Hotelling line (location λi = 0 for i = 1 and λi = 1 for i = 2). ISPs sell
internet access to consumers at price pi and make QoS offers (fi, qi) to CPs, such
that in exchange for a fee fi consumers in network i can be reached at quality qi. In
the case of net neutrality the only offer ISPs can make is of the form (0, qni ) where
qni denotes the best-effort quality in network i, which is free of charge. This reflects
the idea that there is ubiquitous interconnectivity in the economy such that CPs can
reach consumers of network i irrespective of whether there is an existing agreement
with the network. Under paid prioritization ISPs can offer in addition to the free
best-effort quality a prioritization service (fi, qpi ) with fi ≥ 0 where qpi denotes the
priority quality level in network i.
The quality levels qni and q
p
i are derived from a M/M/1 queuing model with an arrival
rate of content requests equal to one such that waiting times are given by
wpi =
1





i without prioritization, (1.2)
where Ni ∈ [0, 1] denotes the mass of consumers connected to ISP i, Yi ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the mass of CPs who purchased prioritization in network i, and ki is the
network capacity of ISP i. Quality levels in network i are then defined as
qpi = 1− wpi with prioritization, (1.3)
qni = 1− wni without prioritization. (1.4)
Further, we make the following assumption regarding network capacities such that
quality levels remain non-negative.
Assumption 1.1 Network capacities are sufficiently large ki ∈ (2,∞).
This assumption ensures that waiting times do not explode for low capacity levels
such that we have wpi , wni ∈ (0, 1) and therefore qpi , qni ∈ (0, 1). Also, this assumption
implies that each network could shoulder the whole traffic by itself such that there
are not any purely allocative reasons behind our setup. Also note that qpi > qni and
limki→∞(q
p
i − qni ) = 0, i.e. if capacities are large waiting times in all queues converge
to zero and quality differences disappear.
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Content providers There is a continuum of differentiated CPs with total mass
normalized to one. CPs are differentiated with respect to their quality sensitivity θ ∈
Θ ≡ [0, 1] which we assume to be uniformly distributed. Low values of θ correspond to
content-types with low sensitivity with respect to transmission quality (e.g. e-mails)
whereas high values represent quality-sensitive services (e.g. live streaming).
We assume the CPs’ business model is entirely passive (e.g. ad-based) and that the
delivery of content of type θ at quality level q to one consumer generates advertisement
revenues r(θ, q) = θq such that θ measures the importance of quality for the revenue
generation. A CP of type θ decides whether to purchase prioritization (hθi = p) in
network i or not (hθi = n) such that profits obtained from network i are given by
pii(θ, hθi ) =
r(θ, q
n
i )Ni if hθi = n
r(θ, qpi )Ni − fi if hθi = p
(1.5)




pii(θ, hθi ). (1.6)
We can then define Pi = {θ ∈ Θ | hθi = p} as the set of content types prioritizing
in network i and Yi =
∫
θ∈Pi dθ as the total mass of prioritized content in network
i.
Consumers There is a continuum of differentiated consumers with total mass
normalized to one. Consumers have a uniformly distributed location x ∈ [0, 1] and
obtain utility v(θ, q) = θq from consuming one unit of content from a CP of type θ
delivered with quality q.5 The total utility Vi from content consumption in network




v(θ, qni )dθ +
∫
θ∈Pi
v(θ, qpi )dθ (1.7)
and can be thought of as a summary statistic for the network quality of ISP i. Overall
utility ui(x) from connecting to network i is then given by
ui(x) = u+ Vi − pi − |λi − x| (1.8)
and depends on the aggregate utility from content consumption Vi, the internet access
price pi and the location of the consumer.6 Lastly, u captures utility which is derived
from connecting to the internet but not covered by our CP model and is assumed to
be sufficiently high such that market coverage is ensured.
5Note, in our model v(θ, q) = r(θ, q) which is a simplifying assumption. We could also allow for
a setting where consumers receive a fraction s of the surplus θqi and CPs the remaining fraction
(1− s). Our results would not change qualitatively.
6We omit the arguments of Vi where it does not lead to confusion.
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Timing In a first step, ISPs set consumer prices pi and (if allowed) prioritization
fees fi. Secondly, consumers decide which network to join and CPs decide in
which network to purchase prioritization (if applicable) simultaneously. The solution
concept is sub-game perfection.
1.4 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we present equilibrium outcomes for the three different QoS regimes
which we will refer to by the superscripts given in brackets: Net neutrality (n), paid
prioritization (p) and Content Delivery Networks (c). Details of the formal analysis
are delegated to Appendix 1.A.1 and proofs can be found in Appendix 1.A.2.
1.4.1 Net neutrality
In this section we consider the benchmark scenario of net neutrality. In this scenario
ISPs can not sell prioritization and their only source of revenue is selling internet
access to consumers, i.e. we have Pi = ∅ and therefore Yi = 0 in both networks. As
the best-effort quality level is free of charge, CPs will reach consumers of network i at
quality level qni such that we have hθ = (n, n) ∀ θ. Total profits from content delivery
obtained by a CP of type θ are then given by
pi(θ, hθ) = θ (qn1N1 + qn2N2) (1.9)
with qni = 1− 1/(ki −Ni) for i = {1, 2}. Turning to consumers the aggregate utility





Since there is only one quality level in the neutral regime all content types arrive at
the uniform quality level qn. The consumer market shares of both ISPs are then given
by the indifferent consumer xˆ : u1(xˆ) = u2(xˆ) on the Hotelling line.
N1 = xˆ ≡ 12 +
1
2 [(V1 − p1)− (V2 − p2)] and N2 = 1− xˆ. (1.11)
Note, that (1.11) defines Ni only implicitly as the quality levels qni also depend on
the consumer market shares. We therefore make use of the implicit function theorem
to obtain market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pi. Details can be found in Appendix 1.A.1.
The first order conditions to the ISPs’ maximization problems
max
pi
Πi = piNi (1.12)
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Note, that even though this is a very simple maximization problem it is not the
standard Hotelling problem. The endogeneity of qni leads to less elastic market shares
Ni. Utilizing symmetry in network capacities ki = kj = k we obtain the unique
symmetric solution pn satisfying pn = arg maxpi Πi|pj=pn where
pn = 1 + 2(2k − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Ni/(∂Ni/∂pi)
. (1.14)
Equilibrium market shares are then given by Ni = Nj = 1/2. Regarding comparative
statics we see that ∂pn/∂k < 0, i.e. consumer prices are lower for higher (symmetric)
capacity levels. The reason is that higher capacity levels make consumer demand more
elastic ∂2Ni/∂pi∂k < 0. Consider the case where k is very large. Then congestion
is basically irrelevant and quality levels in both networks effectively do not depend
on the ISPs’ market shares, such that ISPs only compete in prices. If capacity is
scarce the congestion problem dampens consumers willingness to switch networks as
by joining the rival network the rival’s quality decreases. Hence, demand is less elastic
and consumer prices increase. The property ∂pn/∂k < 0 will reoccur throughout the
analysis and we will refer to it as ‘capacity effect’.
1.4.2 Paid prioritization
In this section we consider the case where ISPs directly offer CPs paid prioritization
agreements. The proposed offer consists of content delivery to all consumers in
network i at priority quality qpi in exchange for a fee fi, while content delivery at
the best-effort quality level qni remains free of charge.7
CPs make the decision whether to purchase prioritization for each network separately.
The decision depends on how the profit of reaching consumers connected to ISP i at
best-effort quality qni compares to the profit under a prioritization agreement with
access to the priority quality qpi . By comparing the profit levels given in (1.5) we can
pin down an indifferent CP of type θˆi such that pii(θˆi, n) = pii(θˆi, p) with
θˆi =
fi
(qpi − qni )Ni
. (1.15)
7As we consider unit demand the distinction between a linear per-consumer fee and a lump-sum
fee to reach all consumers in network i is irrelevant. We stick to the latter specification for reasons
of conciseness.
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CPs will therefore engage in a prioritization contract if they offer sufficiently quality-
sensitive content θ ≥ θˆi, and stick to the best-effort quality if their content type is
insensitive θ < θˆi. The set of prioritizing CPs in network i is then given by Pi = [θˆi, 1]
such that the mass of prioritized traffic in network i is given by Yi = 1− θˆi. Turning









and consists of prioritized (θ ≥ θˆi) and non-prioritized (θ < θˆi) content. The
consumers’ decision which network to join is given as in (1.11) by pinning down




Πi = piNi + fiYi. (1.17)
Due to the endogeneity of the quality levels, we again apply the implicit function
theorem to obtain consumer market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂fj and CP share
reactions ∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Yi/∂fj for i, j = {1, 2}.8 Further we introduce the following
intermediary result which provides us assurance of an interior solution to the
maximization problem.
Lemma 1.1 Each ISP has an incentive to offer prioritization.
Proof. See Appendix.
First, prioritization introduces additional revenue streams on the CP side of the
market. Secondly, compared to no prioritization the network’s overall quality Vi
increases as some highly sensitive content types now arrive at high quality, while the
quality of the remaining content types barely changes. This pushes more consumers
into the network offering prioritization which increases the ISP’s profit even further.
As this argument holds for each ISP irrespective of whether the other ISP offers
prioritization or not, offering prioritization is a strictly dominant strategy. Given
Lemma 1.1 we can now focus on the interior solution given by the first order conditions












Comparing (1.18) to (1.13) we see that optimal consumer price setting now takes
into account the effect on the CP market, where an increase in prices reduces the
number of consumers and hence reduces the revenue from the prioritization business
as it decreases the share of prioritizing CPs. Going back to the definition of the
indifferent content class in (1.15) we see that there are two effects affecting the
8Details can be found in Appendix 1.A.1.
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share of prioritizing CPs. First, there is a direct effect when increasing consumer
prices, as the share of consumers Ni decreases. Secondly, the indifferent content
class depends on the difference in quality levels qpi − qni . As a reduction in the
number of consumers reduces the total traffic in the network and hence the congestion
problem, the difference in quality levels decreases when the number of consumers goes
down, pushing the indifferent content class upwards and hence reducing the share
of prioritizing CPs.9 In summary, introducing prioritization therefore restricts the
ability of ISPs to raise consumer prices.
The optimal prioritization fee similarly balances the revenue generation across both
market sides. While an increase in fees reduces the share of prioritizing CPs, the
effect on the consumer market is not necessarily monotone. Coming from a situation
of no prioritization, a higher share of prioritized content increases utility from content
consumption as quality sensitive content arrives at high quality. However, if the share
of prioritized content is too large, the congestion externality imposed on the priority
queue might outweigh the benefits of prioritizing additional content classes which
would decrease overall network quality.
Continuing with the analysis we find a symmetric equilibrium such that (pp, fp) =
arg maxpi,fi Πi|pj=pp,fj=fp resulting in Yi = Yj = Y p ≡ 1 − θˆp = 2k − ψ and Ni =
Nj = 1/2 as well as ∂Ni/∂fi = 0 for i 6= j with equilibrium values
pp = 5− (8k − 6)ψ(2k − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Ni−∂Ni/∂pi
−fp 4k(2k − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂Yi/∂pi
∂Ni/∂pi





2k(2k − 1). Note that ∂Y p/∂k < 0 (or equivalently ∂θˆp/∂k > 0),
i.e. the higher the capacity level in the market the lower share of prioritized content
classes. If capacity levels rise, networks become less congested and the quality gain
from prioritization decreases.10 Therefore, only CPs with extremely sensitive content
types opt for prioritization. Regarding consumer prices we obtain ∂pp/∂k < 0 which is
in line with the capacity effect described in section 1.4.1. The effect of the quality level
on prioritization fees is given by ∂fp/∂k < 0 which reflects the decreasing advantage of
prioritization if overall capacity is large. Further, this effect prevails even in presence
of an increased elasticity on the consumer market such that standard platform logic
would predict a price increase on the CP market side.
Note that from equations (1.14) and (1.19) we can infer the equilibrium market
share elasticity ∂Ni/∂pi in both regimes. Comparing the two cases we see that the
consumers’ reaction to price changes is stronger in a prioritization regime.11 The
reason for this is that introducing a priority queue already eases the congestion
9It is easy to verify that ∂(qpi − qni )/∂Ni > 0.
10To see this remember that limk→∞(qpi − qni ) = 0.
11The comparison boils down to ψ > 2(2k− 1)2/(4k− 3) which is satisfied under Assumption 1.1.
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problem in the networks. Therefore by switching to the rival network the overall
network quality decreases less, hence market shares are more elastic in a prioritization
regime. We will refer to this effect simply as ‘elasticity effect’. Note this effect is
very similar to the capacity effect described in section 1.4.1. However, while the
capacity effect states that market shares become more elastic when the capacity level
k increases, the elasticity effect states that for a given level of k market shares are
more elastic in a prioritization regime.
Lastly, we get ∂Ni/∂fi = 0 in equilibrium. To gain intuition for this result consider
the case where coming from a neutral regime (fi prohibitively high) the prioritization
fee is reduced such that Yi > 0. This increases the revenue on the CP side and at
the same time increases the network’s quality which attracts more consumers. This
‘double benefit’ is exploited fully in equilibrium, resulting in ∂Ni/∂fi = 0.
1.4.3 Content Delivery Networks
In this section we consider an alteration to the prioritization setup presented in section
1.4.2. In particular we introduce a Content Delivery Network (CDN) as an additional
player which serves as an intermediary between CPs and ISPs. The idea is that
the CDN enters an agreement with ISPs such that traffic coming from the CDN is
prioritized, while traffic not coming from the CDN remains unprioritized.12
For this we introduce an additional ‘offer stage’ at the beginning of the game. In the
offer stage the CDN publicly announces lump-sum transfers Fi ∈ R, which the ISPs
can either accept or reject.13 If ISP i accepts offer Fi, the CDN is free to set the
prioritization fee fi for reaching costumers in network i just like in section 1.4.2 while
ISP i only sets consumer prices pi. If ISP i rejects offer Fi, prioritization in network
i is offered by ISP i instead.14 In any case prices pi, pj and prioritization fees fi, fj
are set simultaneously as before. This setting resembles the industry practice, where
ISPs and CDNs make long-term infrastructure level decisions, while offers made to
consumers and CPs are made once those decisions are made.15
To avoid multiplicity of equilibria we apply the payoff dominance refinement (Harsanyi
and Selten, 1988) to the coordination game in the offer stage, such that in case there
12For simplicity reasons we abstract from any additional quality improvements due to the use of
CDNs.
13One can alternatively consider a two-part tariff Ti = (ti, Fi) ∈ R2 where ti is an additional linear
fee. It is clear that ti introduces a double marginalization inefficiency which would reduce the total
obtainable profit of the CDN. We therefore restrict our analysis to the case of ti = 0 which reduces
the proposal to the lump-sum fee Fi.
14We implicitly assume that ISPs commit to not offer prioritization themselves in case they accept
the offer such that the offer Fi can be seen as an exclusive dealing arrangement. Without commitment
the standard Bertrand argument would apply, as in particular the CDN would undercut any positive
fee set by the ISP.
15The fact that offers Fi are public is a simplifying assumption which allows us to focus on the
induced change in competition dynamics. If we consider private offers instead, existence of the
presented equilibrium remains unchanged.
16 Chapter 1. Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact of CDNs
are multiple equilibria when deciding whether to accept offers Fi, we select the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium in terms of ISP profits.




Πc = fiYi + fjYj − Fi − Fj , i 6= j (1.20)
where Yi and Yj are obtained as in section 1.4.2 and Fi, Fj denote (sunk) lump-sum




Πi = piNi + Fi, i = 1, 2. (1.21)
Market share reactions ∂Ni/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂fj as well as ∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Yi/∂fj for i, j = {1, 2}
are again obtained as in (1.36) giving rise to first order conditions to maximization
problems (1.20) and (1.21) of:
pi =
Ni





, i 6= j. (1.22)
We can immediately see that the maximization problem of the ISPs now closely
resembles the maximization problem under the neutral regime. In particular ISPs
now do not internalize the negative effect of a price increase on the share of prioritized
content as they did in section 1.4.2. However, remember that there is a tiered queue
on the content market, such that the market share reaction differs compared to the
neutral regime due to the elasticity effect. The CDN, on the other hand, internalizes
the effect of a fee setting in market i on the share of prioritized content in network j,
while in section 1.4.2 the fee setting internalized the effect on the consumer market
share in network i.
Continuing with the analysis we again obtain a symmetric equilibrium (f c, f c) =
arg maxfi,fj Πc|pi=pj=pc and pc = arg maxpi Πi|fi=fj=fc,pj=pc for i 6= j resulting in
Ni = Nj = 1/2 and Yi = Yj = Y c ≡ 1 − θˆc = 2k − ψ and ∂Yj/∂fi = 0. Equilibrium
values are given by
pc = 5− (8k − 6)ψ(2k − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Ni−∂Ni/∂pi





2k(2k − 1) as in section 1.4.2. It now remains to show that this sub-game
is actually reached, i.e. the CDN makes offers which are accepted by the ISPs.




Given Lemma 1.2 we know that the CDN prefers contracting with both ISPs compared
to contracting with only one ISP. Further, the proposed offers are accepted by the
ISPs such that the presented equilibrium outcome is indeed sub-game perfect which
allows us to compare derived equilibrium values to the previous QoS regimes. We
immediately see that f c = fp and Y c = Y p while pc 6= pp which gives rise to the
following result.
Proposition 1.1 The use of CDNs is welfare-equivalent to paid prioritization.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1.1 implies that from a total welfare perspective it is irrelevant whether
prioritization is achieved by direct paid prioritization offers made by ISPs, or whether
prioritization is offered through the use of a CDN. In particular the CDN will pick
prioritization fees which are equivalent to the paid prioritization scenario, resulting
in an identical share of prioritized content classes.
Going back to the definition of the critical content class in (1.15), we can see that the
only effect fi has on Yj is via the consumer market share Nj . Now consider the case
of fi, fj being large such that Yi = Yj = 0 and start decreasing fi such that we obtain
Yi > 0. This increases the network quality Vi in network i and hence pulls consumers
from network i into network j, increasing the revenue obtained from network i. Now
consider a decrease in fj such that Yj > 0. Consumers are pulled away from network
i into network j, decreasing the revenue obtained from network i and increasing the
revenue obtained from network j. Given these ‘push-and-pull’ effects, it is optimal for
the CDN to set its prioritization fees such that the marginal effect on the consumer
market vanishes, resulting in ∂Ni/∂fi = 0 and thus ∂Yj/∂fi = 0, which in turn leads
to identical equilibrium fees as in section 1.4.2.
We can also immediately see that pc > pp as the optimal consumer prices now do
not take into account the adverse revenue effect on the CP side ∂Yi/∂pi as is the
case under paid prioritization. Unsurprisingly, we therefore observe higher consumer
prices in the CDN case. As we consider a covered consumer market the total welfare
is unaffected by this price increase, resulting in Proposition 1.1.
1.5 Comparison
This section compares the different QoS regimes from section 1.4. In the first part
we look at profits and consumer surplus separately to gain a better understanding
of the underlying dynamics before combining our results in a single welfare measure.
The second part compares incentives to invest in network capacities.
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1.5.1 Welfare
We start this section by defining simplified surplus metrics for symmetric equilibrium
outcomes. First, remember that in our symmetric outcomes Ni = Nj = 1/2 while
the share of prioritized content is pinned down by an indifferent content class θˆ such
that the share of prioritized content takes the form Yi = Yj = Y = 1− θˆ. It turns out
to be helpful to denote equilibrium quality levels as functions of θˆ such that we have




j = qp(θˆ). Note, that in a regime of net neutrality we have
Y = 0 or equivalently θˆ = θˆn := 1. Starting with the definition of consumer utility
(1.8) we can then denote consumer surplus SC as a function of symmetric consumer
prices p and a cutoff level θˆ:
SC(p, θˆ) = 2
∫ 1/2
0
ui(x)dx = u+ V (θˆ)− p− 14 (1.24)
where







Similarly, we can define total CP industry profits SCP as a function of a cutoff content
class θˆ and a symmetric prioritization fee f in the case of prioritization.16
SCP (f, θˆ) =
V (θˆ)− 2f(1− θˆ) for θˆ < 1V (θˆ) for θˆ = 1 (1.26)
Finally, we can define total ISP (incl. CDN in section 1.4.3) industry profits SISP as
a function of prices p, f and critical content class θˆ.
SISP (p, f, θˆ) =
p+ 2f(1− θˆ) for θˆ < 1p for θˆ = 1 (1.27)
Combining all three measures into a total surplus measure TS we obtain
TS(θˆ) = SC + SCP + SISP = u+ 2V (θˆ)− 14 . (1.28)
We immediately see that the network quality V (θˆ) plays a central role and we therefore
introduce the following intermediate result which will become useful when we compare
the different QoS regimes.
16In a prioritization regime CP industry profits are given by SCP (f, θˆ) =
∫ θˆ
0 pi (θ, (n, n)) dθ +∫ 1
θˆ

















dθ = V (θˆ) − 2f(1 − θˆ) while in the
neutral regime we have SCP (∅, 1) =
∫ 1
0 pi (θ, (n, n)) dθ =
∫ 1
0 2r (q
n(1), θ) dθ = V (1).
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Lemma 1.3 The network quality V (θˆ) is higher in a prioritization regime:
V (1) < V (θˆ), θˆ ∈ (0, 1)
Proof. See Appendix.
To gain intuition for Lemma 1.3 it is helpful to consider the extreme case θˆ = 1, i.e.
no prioritization and all traffic taking place in the best-effort queue. Marginally
decreasing θˆ then implies that highly quality-sensitive content arrives at priority
quality, while the quality for all the remaining traffic remains effectively unchanged,
i.e. overall network quality increases. A similar argument can be made for the other
extreme case θˆ = 0, where all content is ‘prioritized’, i.e. again the entire traffic
takes place in a single quality queue, while for intermediate levels θˆ ∈ (0, 1) content
distributes across both queues and some sensitive content classes arrive at priority
quality. Hence V (θˆ) is high for intermediate levels of θˆ. Starting with consumers we
then obtain the following result by comparing consumer surplus under the different
QoS regimes.
Proposition 1.2 Consumers benefit from prioritization as consumer prices decline
and network quality increases. In particular we have:
i.) V (θˆp) = V (θˆc) > V (θˆn)
ii.) pn > pc > pp
iii.) SC(pp, θˆp) > SC(pc, θˆc) > SC(pn, θˆn)
Proof. See Appendix.
Prioritization has two main benefits for consumers. First, it allocates existing capacity
more efficiently such that highly quality sensitive content arrives at priority quality,
while content classes for which transmission quality plays a minor role are put in a
waiting queue. This increases the total utility from content consumption. Secondly,
prioritization makes it harder for ISPs to raise consumer prices as the consumer
market becomes more elastic, and since losing consumers to the rival network has
an additional negative effect on the revenue obtained on the CP market side. The
last effect is not present in the case of CDNs as here ISPs do not internalize the
negative effect on the CP side. However, in both cases consumers benefit from
prioritization. Turning to the content industry, the following proposition summarizes
the main finding.
Proposition 1.3 The content industry does not benefit from prioritization.
SCP (fn, θˆn) > SCP (fp, θˆp) = SCP (f c, θˆc)
Proof. See Appendix.
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There are two main reasons why the content industry does not profit from
prioritization. For content classes which are not prioritized θ < θˆ, the free best-
effort quality decreases as we have ∂qn(θˆ)/∂θˆ > 0, resulting in lower profits for CPs
with low quality sensitivity. CPs who purchased prioritization now have their content
delivered at higher quality, however, the content delivery is no longer free of charge.
The content class which is indifferent between prioritization and best-effort quality θˆ
is worse off under prioritization, as the best-effort quality decreases compared to
a neutral regime. Only those CPs with very high quality sensitivity potentially
benefit from prioritization. However, in total the content industry is worse off under
prioritization. When it comes to the comparison between a paid prioritization regime
and a CDN based model this result predicts that CPs are indifferent between the two
as the outcome is equivalent.
Proposition 1.4 ISPs do not benefit from prioritization.
SISP (pn, fn, θˆn) > SISP (pc, f c, θˆc) > SISP (pp, fp, θˆp) (1.29)
Proof. See Appendix.
Even though prioritization opens up new revenue streams on the CP side, the
induced competition dynamics on the consumer market lead to lower industry profits.
Consumer prices decrease as the consumer market becomes more elastic and losing
consumers now has additional negative effects on the CP side of the business.
This reduction in revenue outweighs any additional revenue which can be obtained
from selling prioritization to CPs, resulting in lower ISP industry profits under
prioritization. In the case of CDNs the ability to raise consumer prices is less restricted
compared to the paid prioritization case, resulting in higher industry profits in the
presence of CDNs compared to paid prioritization. However, ISPs would be better
off if they would not introduce prioritization offers even if they would be allowed to
do so.
Corollary 1.1 ISPs face a prisoner’s dilemma when deciding whether to offer
prioritization.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1.1 and Proposition 1.4.
As ISPs have an unilateral incentive to introduce prioritization offers (see Lemma
1.1), they end up in a situation where competition for consumers is strengthened
to such an extent, that the negative effect on the consumer market outweighs the
additional revenues made on the CP market side. This result supports the finding in
Bourreau et al. (2015). Delegating the prioritization business to a CDN can then be
seen as a remedy to soften competition on the consumer market.
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Proposition 1.5 Welfare is higher under prioritization
TS(θˆp) = TS(θˆc) > TS(θˆn)
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1.3.
As prices are transfers from consumers to ISPs, and fees from CPs to ISPs /
CDN, the welfare comparison boils down to the aggregate network quality. Under
a prioritization regime the existing network capacity is allocated more efficiently,
resulting in a higher total surplus.
1.5.2 Investment incentives
In this section we want to shed light on how the different QoS regimes affect
investment in network infrastructure. For this we compare investment incentives
from a symmetric equilibrium perspective. The idea is that capacity investments
are typically long-term decisions such that the industry is in equilibrium before the
next investment decisions are made. We assume that investment costs for capacity
expansion are identical in all regimes and therefore restrict our analysis to the
comparison of marginal profits gross of investment costs. The changes of pi, fi, Ni and
Yi with respect to ki are again obtained by applying the implicit function theorem,
while we evaluate all expressions at respective equilibrium values which allows us
to make use of the envelope theorem for simplification. Detailed derivations can be
found in Appendix 1.A.1.














 > 0. (1.30)
The marginal profit of capacity investment mainly depends on the direct effect
∂Ni/∂ki > 0 of investment in network quality and thereby attracting consumers,
and the strategic effect ∂pj/∂ki < 0 of network j in order to recapture lost market
share by decreasing prices. The former effect outweighs the latter, such that the
overall effect is positive, and we will refer to the overall effect simply as ‘consumer
effect’.
22 Chapter 1. Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact of CDNs

























 > 0. (1.31)
The dynamics behind the consumer effect are identical as in the neutral regime but
differ in magnitude (see detailed discussion below). The main difference is that we
now have an additional effect on the CP market side which we will refer to as ‘CP
effect’. We again distinguish two different sub-effects: A direct effect ∂Yi/∂ki < 0 and
a strategic effect ∂pj/∂ki < 0. As a capacity increase eases the congestion problem,
less CPs opt for prioritization, resulting in a negative direct effect. Similar to the
consumer effect, network j reacts by lowering consumer prices, reducing the market
share of network i and thereby making prioritization in network i even less attractive,
resulting in a second negative (strategic) effect. As the business model of prioritization
relies on a congestion problem, investment in capacity expansion directly reduces the
obtainable profit from the CP side of the market. In total the positive consumer
effect, however, outweighs the negative CP effect, resulting in positive investment
incentives.
For the CDN case we need to take into account the effect of the investment decision on
the business relationship with the CDN. It turns out to be helpful to denote the lump-
sum transfer F c as a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the CDN profit where α := F c/Πc . The
investment incentive of an ISP can then be written as dΠ˜i/dki where Π˜i := Πi +αΠc
























CDN effect︷ ︸︸ ︷ dαdki︸︷︷︸
>0
Πcc
 > 0. (1.32)
We now observe three separate effects: a positive consumer effect, a negative CP
effect and a positive ‘CDN effect’. The dynamics in the consumer effect are as before,
however, the CP effect now consists only of two direct effects. On the one hand, a
capacity increase in network i reduces the congestion problem and hence the benefit
from prioritization ∂Yi/∂ki < 0. On the other hand, it also attracts consumers
from network j to join network i and makes thereby prioritization in network j less
attractive ∂Yj/∂ki < 0, resulting again in a negative CP effect in total. The CDN
effect reflects the fact that as capacity increases the ISP obtains a larger share of
the CDN profits. This has mainly two reasons. First, increasing capacity ki reduces
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CDN profits dΠc/dki < 0 (see CP effect). Secondly, increasing capacity increases the
outside option of an ISP, resulting in a higher share of obtainable CDN profits and a
positive CDN effect.17
In figure 1.1 we now illustrate the magnitude of the different effects for various levels of
initial symmetric network capacity k. Proposition 1.6 summarizes the main findings
of the illustrated results.
Figure 1.1: Comparison of investment incentives
Proposition 1.6 Incentives to invest in network capacity are highest in the CDN
case. Paid prioritization leads to higher investment incentives than a neutral regime
if capacity is scarce k ≤ k.
Proof. See Appendix.
First, note that the consumer effect is positive in all regimes while the CP effect is
negative in the two prioritization regimes. In the CDN case there is an additional
positive CDN effect. Those effects, however, differ in magnitude.
Starting with the consumer effect we would first like to mention that the direct effect
∂Ni/∂ki is strongest in the neutral regime. Since a tiered quality scheme already
reduces the congestion problem, the marginal effect of capacity expansion is higher
when the congestion problem is severe, as in the single-queue (neutral) regime. This
means, however, that the strategic effect introduced by ∂pj/∂ki must be the driving
17We refer to the proof of Proposition 1.6 for details.
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force behind the ranking in magnitude displayed in the top right graph of figure
1.1. As explained in section 1.4.2, prioritization leads to a more elastic consumer
market. Hence, the market share reaction with respect to rival’s prices ∂Ni/∂pj is
more strongly pronounced in the prioritization regimes. For the same reason, however,
the strategic response by ISP j to an increase in capacity ki is less pronounced in the
prioritization regimes. As the consumer market share is more elastic, prices pj are
decreased to a lower extent than in the neutral regime. The strategic effect combined
with a more elastic consumer market results in a stronger consumer effect in the
prioritization regimes.
The CP effect is negative in both prioritization cases, however, their composition
differs. While under paid prioritization only the direct effect on the proprietary
network ∂Yi/∂ki < 0 is taken into account, in the CDN solution direct effects of both
networks are taken into account. The main driver for the difference in magnitude is,
however, the weighting factor α in the CDN case, such that in a CDN environment
ISPs do not fully internalize the negative effect on the CP market side when deciding
on investment in network capacity. In addition to the less pronounced CP effect, ISPs
obtain an additional positive CDN effect resulting in highest total marginal profits
from capacity investment.
The comparison between the neutral and the paid prioritization regime depends on
initial capacity levels.18 If capacity is scarce k ≤ k the stronger consumer effect in the
discriminatory regime dominates the neutral regime even in light of the negative CP
effect. If capacity is abundant k > k on the other hand, consumer effects are virtually
identical as high overall capacity makes prioritization irrelevant such that the negative
CP effect prevails, yielding higher investment incentives in the neutral regime. In light
of existing QoS differentiation measures and global efforts to incentivize broadband
investment, we consider the case of scarcity to be more relevant.
1.6 Conclusion
We analyzed equilibrium outcomes under different QoS practices and showed that
discriminatory regimes are superior in terms of static efficiency as they allocate
existing capacity more efficiently, while at the same time competition for consumers is
strengthened, resulting in lower consumer prices and higher network quality in both
discriminatory regimes compared to a neutral regime. The extent to which consumers
benefit, however, depends on the way how prioritization is achieved. While prices are
lowest under paid prioritization, consumer prices increase with the use of CDNs, as
ISPs lack the additional incentive to attract consumers to make prioritization more
valuable.
18The critical capacity level is k ≈ 6.45. Details can be found in the proof of Proposition 1.6.
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Regarding investment incentives we showed that both discriminatory regimes lead to
higher investment in network capacity than the neutral regime as long as capacity is
scarce, while investment is highest in a CDN environment irrespective of the initial
capacity level. Under paid prioritization marginal profits obtained from the consumer
market side are higher than in the neutral regime, while marginal profits obtained
from the CP side are negative as capacity expansion makes prioritization less valuable.
In a CDN scenario this detrimental effect on the CP side is not fully internalized,
while at the same time ISPs are able to capture a larger fraction of CDN profits when
network capacity is expanded, resulting in high investment incentives.
We would like to mainly draw two policy conclusions where the first is driven by our
efficiency result. As long as content is heterogeneous and network capacity is scarce, a
tiered-quality scheme increases efficiency. This result is not driven by the assumption
that total demand on the consumer market is inelastic, as a discriminatory regime
simultaneously reduces consumer prices. Also, since the best-effort quality remains
free of charge no CPs are excluded from the market. For the second conclusion
one should note that the general debate on net neutrality tends to focus on ISP
practices, while the use of CDNs is barely mentioned. Our results suggest that while
the outcome with CDNs is welfare equivalent to the classical paid prioritization,
consumer surplus is lower in the presence of CDNs due to higher prices. Focusing on
static efficiency and having consumer welfare in mind, a regime of paid prioritization
is therefore to be preferred. If the primary policy goal is, however, investment in
network infrastructure then our results suggest that a CDN environment is to be
preferred over paid prioritization.
We would also like to point out limitations of our analysis and where future research
could be headed. First, we implicitly assume that from a technical perspective
contracting with a CDN is equivalent to direct prioritization between ISPs and CPs.
Here, a more nuanced analysis could refine the comparison with respect to efficiency.
Also, we modeled the contractual relationship between ISPs and CDNs in rather
general way. Here, industry specific payment structures (access pricing, etc.) could
provide further insights. Lastly, one could alter the industry structure in the upstream
market and introduce competition between CDNs.




For the consumer market share we define an ancillary equation
∆N = N1 − xˆ (1.33)
where xˆ denotes the indifferent consumer on the Hotelling line as in (1.11). To obtain the
market share reaction ∂N1/∂pi we then totally differentiate ∆N = 0 with respect to consumer






while ∂N2/∂pi = −∂N1/∂pi due to full market coverage. In the case of a prioritization regime
we additionally define ancillary equations for the share of prioritized content:




, i = {1, 2}. (1.35)
Reactions with respect to consumer prices ∂Yi/∂pj , ∂Ni/∂pj and prioritization fees ∂Yi/∂fj ,
∂Ni/∂fj for i, j = {1, 2} are then obtained by totally differentiating equations ∆N = 0,



















where ∆Z = {∆N ,∆Yi ,∆Yj} and i, j = {1, 2}. Market share reactions with respect to
prioritization fees ∂Yi/∂fj , ∂Ni/∂fj can be obtained by an equivalent procedure.
Investment incentives
First we outline how we obtain reactions ∂Nj/∂ki, ∂Yj/∂ki, ∂pj/∂ki and ∂fj/∂ki for j =
{1, 2}. We will demonstrate the procedure in the paid prioritization case as it can
easily be adjusted to yield the reactions in the other regimes. We make extensive use
of the implicit function theorem by totally differentiating the first order conditions of
ISPs i and j as well as the ancillary equations ∆N = 0, ∆Yi = 0 and ∆Yj = 0
with respect to ki. The result is the following system of equations where for Z =

























































We now turn to the definition of investment incentives. Starting with the neutral regime,






















Imposing symmetry and evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = pn allows us to further















































































Imposing symmetry ki = kj = k, evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = pp, fi = fj = fp,
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Evaluating at equilibrium values pi = pj = pc, fi = fj = f c for the symmetric case ki = kj = k




















































































































Finally, using ∂Yi/∂pi = −∂Yj/∂pi for i 6= j we obtain the final simplified form. Furthermore,
















where dΠci/dki and dΠcc/dki are derived above, while dΠAi /dki is obtained precisely as in
(1.37) and (1.38) applied to the asymmetric game structure outlined in the proof of Lemma
1.2.
1.A.2 Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. To prove the result define f i such that
θˆi =
f iNi
Ni(qpi − qni )
= 1.






= − 3k2(k − x̂) < 0
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where x̂ denotes the indifferent consumer obtained as in (1.11). Hence, decreasing f i and
thus offering prioritization would lead to higher profits Πi.
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. We consider three different sub-game outcomes: a symmetric outcome where both
ISPs contract with the CDN, an asymmetric outcome where only one ISP contracts with
the CDN and the case where no ISP contracts with the CDN. The last case leads to zero
profits for the CDN such that it suffices to show that profits in the other two cases are weakly
positive to exclude this case.
To ease notation let Πcc = 2f cY c and Πci = pc/2 denote the equilibrium profits of the sub-game
outlined in section 1.4.3, and Πpi = pp/2 + fpY p be the equilibrium ISP profit from section
1.4.2. Further consider the following asymmetric game where ISP j delegates prioritization
to the CDN, while ISP i does not contract with the CDN. As the lump-sum transfers do
not affect the price choice in the subsequent simultaneous move game, we can solve for the
asymmetric solution (pAi , pAj , fAi , fAj ) by following the same steps as outlined in section 1.4.3
such that
(pAi , fAi ) = arg max
pi,fi
ΠAi = piNi + fiYi|pj=pAj ,fj=fAj , (1.46)
pAj = arg max
pj
ΠAj = pjNj |pi=pAi ,fi=fAi ,fj=fAj , (1.47)
fAj = arg max
fj
ΠAc = fjYj |pi=pAi ,pj=pAj ,fi=fAi . (1.48)














































(−2k − 3NAi + 3)k2














and Y Aj = 1−
k +NAi − 1√
k(k +NAi − 1) + k +NAi − 1
(1.53)
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We denote the payoffs evaluated at the asymmetric equilibrium solution simply as ΠAi ,ΠAj
and ΠAc .
Starting with the symmetric outcome outlined in section 1.4.3, an ISP will not deviate from
the acceptance of an offer F c if Πci + F c ≥ ΠAi such that the optimal offer from the point of
view of an CDN is given by F c = ΠAi − Πci . Also, the CDN’s participation constraint must
be satisfied such that Πc− 2F c ≥ 0. Substituting F c and rearranging we obtain the sufficient
condition
Πcc + 2Πci − 2ΠAi ≥ 0 (1.55)
for the existence of an offer F c which is accepted by both ISPs.
Turning to the asymmetric case we need acceptance of an offer Fˆ such that ΠAj + Fˆ ≥ Πpi
where Fˆ = Πpi −ΠAj is the lowest offer accepted by one ISP, while the offer to the other ISP
can simply be set to −∞ to make sure that only one ISP contracts with the CDN. Similarly,
we need to make sure that the participation constraint of the CDN is satisfied such that
ΠAc − Fˆ ≥ 0 or after substituting
ΠAc + ΠAj −Πpi ≥ 0. (1.56)
In order for the symmetric case to be sub-game perfect we additionally require that the
achievable payoff from contracting with both ISPs is higher than in the asymmetric case such
that Πc − 2F c ≥ ΠAc − Fˆ or after substituting and rearranging
Πcc + 2Πci + Π
p
i −ΠAc − 2ΠAi −ΠAj ≥ 0. (1.57)
Conditions (1.55) - (1.57) are sufficient to prove existence of symmetric fees F c which are
accepted by both ISPs and satisfy the participation constraint of the CDN, and furthermore
these conditions assure that the symmetric outcome is preferred to the asymmetric case,
assuring that the equilibrium of the sub-game characterized in section 1.4.3 is indeed sub-
game perfect. As all three conditions depend on the asymmetric solution, we address the
implicit definition of NAi in (1.54) by evaluating equilibrium payoffs ΠAc ,ΠA and ΠAj for a
given level k at the root to ∆NA = 0. We can then perform numerical analysis for arbitrary
values of k to verify that all three conditions are satisfied. An illustration of the numerical
analysis can be seen in the following figure where ‘sym’ refers to the LHS of (1.55), ‘asym’ to
the LHS of (1.56) and ‘comp’ to the LHS of (1.57).
Following the same procedure one can verify that for given offers Fi = Fj = F c there also
exists the reject/reject equilibrium in the offer stage which leads to payoffs Πpi for both ISPs.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of conditions (1.55)-(1.57)
This equilibrium is payoff dominated by the accept/accept equilibrium and therefore is subject
to our refinement.
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. As the consumer market is inelastic, the equivalence follows directly from θˆc = θˆp.
Proof of Lemma 1.3
Proof. This result follows from the definition of V (θˆ) in (1.25). After basic simplifications we
obtain V (θˆ) = 3/2− θˆ/(2k− 1)− 2k/(2k− (1− θˆ)) and V (1) = (2k− 3)/(4k− 2). Comparing
V (θˆ) > V (1) then reduces to (1− θˆ) > 0, which is satisfied for θˆ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. The result in i.) follows from Lemma 1.3. For ii.) we rearrange pn > pc to ψ >
(8k2 − 8k + 1)/(4k − 3). Squaring both sides and basic simplification steps lead to (4k −
3)2(4k2 − 2k− 1) > 0 which is true by Assumption 1.1. For pc > pp we immediately see that
pc − pp = fp4k/(2k − 1) > 0. Point iii.) follows directly from i.) and ii.).
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. The inequality SCP (fp, θˆp) = SCP (f c, θˆc) < SCP (fn, θˆn) reduces to 2θˆc = 2θˆp < 1.
As ∂θˆp/∂k = ∂θˆc/∂k > 0 it follows from limk→∞ θˆp = 1/2 that 2θˆp = 2θˆc < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. First note that SISP (pc, f c, θˆc) > SISP (pp, fp, θˆp) follows from the proof of
Proposition 1.2 as it boils down to the difference in consumer prices. The second inequality
SISP (pn, fn, θˆn) > SISP (pc, f c, θˆc) can be rearranged to 2k(1+12k2+5ψ+ψ2) < ψ2+4k2(5+
4ψ). Substituting ψ2 = 2k(2k − 1) and rearranging yields (16k2 − 14k + 2)/(8k − 5) < ψ.
Squaring both sides and rearranging yields (5− 8k)2(3k − 2) > 0, which is true.
Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1.3 and Proposition 1.2.
32 Chapter 1. Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact of CDNs
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proof. Following the procedure outlined in Appendix 1.A.1 we obtain closed form solutions
for investment incentives in all three QoS regimes. In the case of net neutrality and paid
prioritization the investment incentives only depend on the initial symmetric capacity level k.
As investment incentives in the CDN case partly depend on the asymmetric solution outlined
in the proof of Lemma 1.2), we obtain a final form depending on k and an asymmetric market
share NAi which is implicitly defined by ∆NA = 0 in (1.54). We denote investment incentives
in the three regimes therefore as κn(k), κp(k) and κc(k,NAi ) but refrain from stating explicit
expressions at this point.
Comparing κn(k) and κp(k) reveals a critical level k ≈ 6.45 such that κn(k) ≤ κp(k) for
k ≤ k and κn(k) > κp(k) for k > k. For the comparison to the CDN case we rely on
a numerical approach where we evaluate κc(k,NAi )) for a given level k at the root NAi to














Based on Dimakopoulos and Sudaric (2018).
2.1 Introduction
Online platforms often do not charge monetary prices from users but monetize
through an advertisement-based business model building on the collection and
processing of user data. Typical examples include social networks (e.g. Facebook,
LinkedIn), search engines (e.g. Bing, Google) or video platforms (e.g. Youtube,
Vimeo). The role of user data in this context is ambiguous. From the platform
perspective user data is an input factor which can be used to gain insights about
users and improve the targeting of advertisement, resulting in a superior product for
potential advertisers. This commodity attribute of data is mirrored to a lesser extent
on the user side. Users typically accept some conditions to what extent personal
data is collected and processed when using a platform service. In some cases the
provision of personal data is necessary to make meaningful use of a platform service
(e.g. social networks), while in other cases services do not require the collection of
user data per se (e.g. search engines, mail providers, video platforms). In both cases
the provision of data from a user perspective can be interpreted as a price the user
is willing to accept in exchange for the use of the platform including the display of
ads.19 To put it in terms of platform economics, user data requirements exhibit price
characteristics on the one hand, and affect indirect network effects (e.g. targeting) at
the same time.
This ambiguity makes it especially hard for policy makers, as standard economic
arguments might not be applicable. Indeed, the European Data Protection Supervisor
19A study by the Pew Research Center (2014) shows that 91 percent of respondents agree that they
lost control over how companies collect personal data while 55 percent state that they are willing
to share some information in exchange for using a free service. The European Commission (2015),
however, reports that 72 percent of internet users worry that they provide too much data online.
This indicates that users are aware and willing to exchange personal data for services, however, the
actual extent worries them.
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(EDPS) argues that competition authorities should take privacy and data related
aspects more into account (EDPS, 2014).20 And indeed, recent cases demonstrate
that competition authorities acknowledge the peculiarities of data-driven industries.
Germany’s Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, BKartA) initiated investigations
against Facebook in 2016 based on alleged abuse of market power. In particular, the
BKartA investigates whether Facebook uses its dominant position in the market for
social networks to expand the terms of service outlining how much data is collected
and processed by the platform.21 Therefore, we want to shed some light on the role
of competition intensity in a two-sided market framework when users provide data
and this data is monetized on the opposing market side.22
We analyze a setting of two competing ad-financed platforms in a two-sided market
framework. On the user market side, platforms strategically set the required level of
data provision, to which users have to agree to obtain access to the platform service.
Platforms process this user data to sell improved ad targeting on the advertiser market
side. While users incur disutility from providing data (privacy concerns, opportunity
costs), they benefit from seeing more relevant ads. Users and advertisers are assumed
to single-home.
Our model predicts that platforms will extract a distorted amount of data compared to
the efficient benchmark. The distortion is induced through the one-sided monetization
in a way that platforms do not perfectly balance the costs of data provision, i.e.
privacy costs incurred by users, against the targeting benefits on both market sides,
but put too much or too little weight on the benefit captured by the monetized
market side. This distortion depends on the net effect of cross-group externalities as
well as the degree of competition intensity on both market sides. If targeting benefits
are small or competition is weak, an inefficiently high level of data is collected. On
the other hand, if competition is strong or targeting benefits sufficiently outweigh
nuisance costs, too little data is collected. From the point of view of consumers the
competitive level of data provision is always too high, suggesting that applying a
consumer standard to online platforms leads to underprovision of personal data. The
competitive equilibrium level of data provision, however, is monotone in the degree of
competition intensity: the weaker the competition on either side of the market, the
higher the equilibrium amount of data provision. This result is interesting because it
20Whether competition authorities should incorporate aspects of privacy and data protection is,
however, controversial. For arguments in favor we refer to Stucke and Grunes (2016), arguments
against can be found e.g. in Cooper (2013).
21Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of
having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules’, Press Release, 2 March
2016, http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_
03_2016_Facebook.html.
22Classical examples include ad-based business models where data is used to improve ad targeting or
matching / recommendation platforms, where users are presented offers which become more relevant
the more the platform knows about its users. For illustration purposes we stick to the example of
targeted advertising and refer to the extension part of this paper for a more general consideration of
cross-group externalities, i.e. also the possibility of users enjoying the presence of firm’s offers.
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does not follow the common two-sided platform logic that less elasticity on one side
typically decreases the other side’s price.
Our findings indicate that the inefficiency of data provision can be reduced by careful
privacy regulation or competition policies on either market side. One interpretation of
this result is that (competition) policy measures in these data-driven industries should
take into account the effects they have on the extent of private data collection.
We also consider a variety of extensions to this setup. In the first one we depart from
the assumption that platforms are restricted in their price setting on the user side,
and allow for non-zero user prices. In fact, lifting the restriction leads to an efficient
level of collected data, while user prices can be positive, negative (or zero). This
gives rise to two interpretations. The first is a Coasian one, where establishing the
missing market on the user side leads to an efficient outcome. This reflects the idea
of Laudon (1996) that users should be adequately compensated for the provision of
their data, while the problem of the ‘data economy’ lies precisely in the absence of
such a market. The second interpretation is of counterfactual nature. In particular
we argue that whenever the unrestricted model would yield positive (negative) user
prices, the restricted model exhibits overprovision (underprovision) of user data as
platforms can no longer adequately charge or compensate users for collecting data.
The second extension considers different degrees of platform collusion and we conclude
that the amount of collected data is excessively high under full collusion, while this
is not necessarily the case under partial collusion. In the third extension we discuss
the robustness of our results with respect to multi-homing and elastic total demand.
Lastly, we demonstrate that our results naturally extend to settings with positive
cross-group externalities (matching platforms).
2.2 Related literature
Methodologically, our research is related to the literature on platform competition in
general and on applications in media markets in particular. We consider a competitive
setting with two-sided single-homing which has been analyzed by Armstrong (2006)
in a more general framework and later extended in Armstrong and Wright (2007).
However, both papers consider the case where platforms engage in two-sided pricing
while non-monetary aspects (as e.g. user data) are not modelled. We also share
a common component with the literature on media platforms in the sense that
we, at least in our baseline model, consider the case of opposing indirect network
effects, where advertisers like to reach many users but users dislike the presence of
advertisers. This reflects the idea of ‘peace and quiet’ privacy in Posner (1981) and is
a common assumption in the media literature (see Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006)
for a review). This setup is used e.g. to study competition in TV markets (see
e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005) or Peitz and Valletti (2008)) where platforms do
not engage in targeted advertising and therefore the expected revenue per user as
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well as perceived nuisance are constant. Our research differs in the sense that we
endogenize those indirect network effects as we let them to be affected by the level of
data collected. The concept of endogenous network effects is captured in Reisinger
(2012) where users spend time using platform services and platforms translate this
activity into better targeting and reduced nuisance. A similar setup is presented in
Bourreau et al. (2018), however the research question differs substantially. The key
difference is that in our model the level of data provision is a strategic decision of
the competing platforms, while in the two previously mentioned papers consumers
voluntarily spend time/provide data on the platforms which changes the competitive
dynamics significantly.
We also contribute to the broader literature on efficient provision of personal data
and the role of privacy as a competition instrument. The aspect of data provision
being a strategic choice made by platforms is captured to some extent by Spiegel
(2013) who compares commercial software (full privacy) to adware (positive privacy
costs) and shows that adware is welfare superior. De Corniere and De Nijs (2016)
consider a setting where a monopolistic platform auctions off advertising slots and
decides whether to disclose consumer information (no privacy) or not (privacy). They
show that platforms might prefer information disclosure, which comes at the cost of
some consumers leaving the market such that from a welfare point of view it is not
clear which regime is preferable. Bloch and Demange (2018) present a setting where
consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their privacy cost and a monopolistic
platform decides how much data to extract. They show that depending on parameter
values the amount of data collection can be excessively high. A similar setting is
presented in Lefouili and Toh (2017) where a monopolistic platform monetizes on
disclosing personal information to third parties. The authors conclude that one of
the inefficiencies arising is excessive information disclosure. The mentioned papers
consider the case of monopolistic platforms, while we consider the case of competing
platforms, allowing for varying degrees of competition intensity on both market
sides.
The role of privacy in a competitive environment is considered in Casadesus-Masanell
and Hervas-Drane (2015) where firms not only compete in a price dimension but
also in a quality dimension which the authors motivate as privacy. They show that
compared to a monopolistic firm, competition leads to a higher degree of privacy while
increasing competition intensity does not necessarily imply that privacy improves
even further. A key assumption in their model is that prices for disclosing consumer
information are exogenous, while in our model platforms have market power vis-à-vis
advertisers and hence face a tradeoff. They also show that low privacy firms tend
to subsidize consumers, while high privacy firms charge positive consumer prices.
Similarly, Kummer and Schulte (2016) show empirically that there is a trade-off
between money and privacy for users. They analyze mobile application data and
find that apps are cheaper when more personal data can be collected. These results
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reoccur in our two-sided pricing extension as we show that user prices can be positive
or negative as well, while the degree of privacy provision is excessively high or low
once firms can no longer compensate users for their data provision. To our knowledge
there are very few empirical studies examining the interaction between market power
and privacy. In fact, the only study we are aware of is Bonneau and Preibusch
(2010) who relate the extent of data collection policies of various online services to
the competitiveness of the market they are operating in. They show that the more
market power a firm has, the more personal information is asked to be provided which
is in line with our model.
2.3 Model
We analyze a setting where two symmetric platforms, i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, compete
for advertisers and users. Advertisers and users are distributed uniformly on different
Hotelling lines of unit length and are assumed to both single-home. This assumption
allows us to focus on the role of competition intensity more clearly.23 Platforms are
located at the ends of the respective Hotelling lines such that platform i is located at
location li = 0 and platform j at lj = 1. Note that on the advertiser and the user side
we have distinct Hotelling lines and therefore distinct parameters of transportation
costs, which we will later interpret as different degrees of competition intensity. The
idea is that the degree of competition faced by platforms does not have to be same
for all market sides. For example, online platforms from different segments, such as
search engines, social networks, video streaming platforms or mail providers, may all
compete for the same advertisers, however competition for users may occur separately
and independently of the other segments.
2.3.1 Users
A user located at x on the Hotelling line obtains utility ui(x) from joining platform
i where
ui(x) = u− κ(di)− ν(di)Ai − tu|li − x|. (2.1)
The first term of the utility function is a fixed utility component u from using platform
services, which is the same for both platforms. Second, κ(di) ≥ 0 denotes the privacy
(opportunity) costs of providing user data di to the platform, whereby we assume
that costs are strictly convex and twice differentiable, and specifically that κ′(0) = 0,
while κ′(d) > 0 for all d > 0 and κ′′(d) > 0 for all d. Third, users incur nuisance cost
ν(d) ≥ 0 per advertisements Ai on the platform. We assume that users (weakly) prefer
personalized to non-personalized ads, i.e. ν(d) is a convex and twice differentiable
function s.t. ν ′(d) ≤ 0 and ν ′′(d) ≥ 0. This setup reflects the idea that the more
23In Section 2.7 we discuss multi-homing.
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relevant an ad, the higher the chance of value creation through a possible follow-
up purchase.24 Finally, users face transportation costs due to horizontal platform
differentiation, whereby we assume uniform user distribution on the Hotelling line,
i.e. x u∼ [0, 1], while tu > 0 is the associated transportation cost parameter.
Consumers in our baseline model are not charged a monetary price explicitly, which
makes our model comparable to e.g. Reisinger (2012). We follow the same line of
reasoning as e.g. in Peitz and Reisinger (2016) and Waehrer (2015) that there are
some exogenous constraints preventing platforms from charging non-zero consumer
prices. This restriction is, however, relaxed in section 2.7.1. In order to join a platform
users have to provide some personal data di in our model. This is different to the
setup in Reisinger (2012) or Bourreau et al. (2018) as in our model platforms can
set the level of data which has to be provided by the users, whereas in their models
consumers voluntarily provide a certain amount of time. The idea behind our setup
is that consumers accept terms and conditions when using a platform which requires
them to accept a certain level of data provision or alternatively cases where users
have to register for an account by providing personal information before they can use
the platform service. This specification on the consumer side allows us to focus on
user data di as primary strategic aspect for competition.
2.3.2 Advertisers
An advertiser located at a on the Hotelling line obtains an expected profit of pii(a)
from posting a single ad on platform i,
pii(a) = τ(di)(1− pi)Xi − ta|li − a|. (2.2)
The interaction with Xi users on platform i generates a normalized expected revenue
of 1, if users decide to ‘click on the ad’, which happens with probability τ(di). The
strictly concave and twice differentiable function τ(d) ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the
targeting ability of platforms: the more data d can be collected from users, the more
effective the targeting and hence the higher the probability that a user clicks on this
ad, i.e. we have that τ ′(d) > 0 and τ ′′(d) < 0. At the same time we assume that
advertisers only pay the platform a price pi if the ad has been clicked (cost-per-click)
such that the expected revenue per user is given by τ(di)(1− pi), which is consistent
with real-world pricing practices. The second term reflects advertisers transportation
costs when joining platform i. Again we assume uniform advertiser distribution on
the Hotelling line, i.e. a u∼ [0, 1], and ta > 0 as the transportation cost parameter on
the advertiser side.
24Note that our set-up allows for positive utility of seeing advertisement as well, as long as this
positive utility is again concave in the amount of provided data. However, for sake of clarity we stay
with the notion of negative utility of nuisance in the subsequent text and consider the case of positive
cross-group externalities as an extension in section 2.7.
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2.3.3 Platforms
The business model of platforms in our model is purely ad-based. While they
offer (exogenous) platform services (u) to users, revenue is only generated through
presenting ads to users.25 Platform profits are then given by
Πi (di, pi) = AiXiτ(di)pi, (2.3)
i.e. Ai advertisers at platform i pay pi whenever the platform’s users Xi click on
an ad with probability τ(di).26 The crucial novelty in our model is that we assume
that besides charging prices to advertisers, platforms extract data di from their users.
While di shares some price characteristics from the point of view of users, data is an
essential input factor for the click-probability the advertisers are facing. At the same
time we assume that not only the click probability increases through better targeting
possibilities but also the nuisance decreases.
2.3.4 Assumptions
Wemake the following assumptions to ensure full advertiser and user market coverage,
allowing us to study environments of full platform competition.27
Assumption 2.1 Competition for advertisers is sufficiently strong, i.e. ta ≤ t¯a.
This implies that competition for users is sufficiently weak and that there are gains
of trade for all advertisers, even without data collection, i.e.
(a) tu > ν(0),
(b) ta < τ(0).
The upper bound on ta is given by t¯a := tuτ(0)−ν(0)τ(0)3tu+ν(0) . This assumption on the upper
bound of ta allows us to isolate effects in a competitive environment. Intuitively, this
constitutes a sufficient condition, such that for any level of (symmetric) data provision
d ≥ 0, it is assured that all advertisers obtain non-negative profits. Consequently,
competition for advertisers is sufficiently strong.
The condition on the consumer nuisance function, i.e. the necessary condition (a)
of Assumption 2.1, can be motivated as follows: no platform will obtain the entire
user market, even if all ads were placed on the rival platform. Technically, this is
25In Section 2.7 we discuss two-sided pricing.
26Note that platforms and advertisers share the profit created by each targeted user on the platform.
However, this does not mean that their incentives are perfectly aligned, since platforms additionally
care about the number of advertisers joining.
27In Section 2.7 we discuss relaxing the full-market coverage assumptions.
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established by tu > ν(0).28 The condition on the targeting technology, i.e. the
necessary condition (b) of Assumption 2.1, states that even without collecting any
data advertisers can still profitably join a platform. In particular we assume that there
are gains of trade for all advertisers. Intuitively, this assumption states that there is
a positive probability for users to click an ad even if the ad is not targeted at all. And
this probability, τ(0), exceeds the transportation cost incurred by any advertiser ta,
such that no advertisers are excluded, even if too little data is collected.
Assumption 2.2 The fixed utility component u is large enough to ensure full market
coverage on the user side.
Intuitively, the platform service provides sufficient utility such that users are not
deterred through the provision of personal data and seeing ads.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage platforms simultaneously set
prices pi and the required level of data di to join their platform. In the second stage
advertisers and users observe the platforms’ choices and simultaneously decide which
platform to join, hence determining Ai and Xi.29 The equilibrium concept is subgame
perfection and we solve the game by backward induction.
2.4 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we will first present the results for the second-stage subgame of user and
advertiser allocation. Then we will show the efficient and the user-optimal outcome
as well as the market outcome in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
2.4.1 Second stage market shares
In the second stage the market shares on the consumer and advertiser side are given
by the standard Hotelling procedure. Utilizing the unit length of the Hotelling line,
and given full user market coverage due to Assumption 2.2, the number of users
joining a platform is then determined by the indifferent consumer xˆ : ui(xˆ) = uj(xˆ)
such that





[κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj)Aj − ν(di)Ai] , Xj = 1− xˆ. (2.4)
Similarly, market shares on the advertiser side are given by the indifferent advertiser
aˆ : pii(aˆ) = pij(aˆ). Note that Assumption 2.1 assures market coverage gross of
advertising prices. For now we therefore assume that prices permit full market
28Note that tu > ν(0) ⇒ tu > ν(d) ∀d because ν′(d) ≤ 0. Given any (symmetric) amount of data
d ≥ 0 collected by both platforms, even if all advertisers used platform j such that Ai = 0 and
Ai = 1, at least the user most loyal to platform j, i.e. located directly at lj , would rather stay at this
platform j, even though it is full of ads. In other words, competition for users is sufficiently weak.
29We could also consider an alternative timing where advertisers choose first and users last. The
outcome is equivalent in our model.
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coverage and check later that in equilibrium this is indeed the case. Market shares
are then given by





[τ(di)(1− pi)Xi − τ(dj)(1− pj)Xj ] , Aj = 1− aˆ. (2.5)
Solving the system of equations given in (2.4) and (2.5) yields unique market shares
Xi, Xj , Ai and Aj as functions of data requirements di, dj and prices pi, pj . Explicit
solutions are provided in the Appendix.
2.4.2 Efficiency benchmark
For the derivation of the welfare-efficient benchmark, we define welfare as the sum of
all indirect utilities and profits, anticipating second stage market shares as in 2.4.1,
i.e.












pij(a)da+ Πi + Πj .
(2.6)
Proposition 2.1 Welfare is maximized by the unique symmetric solution (do, po) =






resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. Aoi = 1/2 and Xoi = 1/2.
The price po can be freely chosen to split the rent between advertisers and platforms.30
The welfare-optimal level of data do is chosen in a way such that users’ marginal
cost of data provision κ′(do) equals the sum of marginal benefits across both market
sides, i.e. the marginal benefit of enhanced targeting τ ′(do)/2 and the marginal
benefit of reduced nuisance −ν ′(do)/2, while the factor 1/2 is due to the symmetric
market shares.31 Furthermore, the optimal level of data provision is independent
of transportation cost parameters ta and tu. Since prices are just transfers from
advertisers to platforms they do not affect welfare.32
30Note that po has to be sufficiently small such that the advertiser market remains fully covered.
The upper bound on po is then obtained from the participation constraint of the indifferent advertiser
at a = 1/2 such that pii(1/2) ≥ 0↔ po ≤ 1− ta/τ(do) < 1.
31For very low transportation cost parameters and sufficiently high net benefits τ(·)− ν(·) on the
platform it might be efficient from a welfare perspective to shut one platform down and let the entire
market be served by the other platform due to high network effects. In this case the very fact of
having a competing platform is an inefficiency. While this corner solution exhibits an interesting
property of platform markets, it is not the focus of this paper and we therefore stick to the case
where we have an interior, i.e. duopoly solution as the efficient benchmark.
32The same data level do would result if we only choose di to maximize welfare, while anticipating
firms setting ad prices pi subsequently. These prices would be identical to the prices in the market
outcome, given by equation (2.13). The same argument applies for the user optimal level du.
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2.4.3 User-optimal outcome
Let us now turn to the user-optimal level of data provision. If users are free to decide
on the amount of data provided, the user-optimal level du is derived from consumer
surplus, which is identical to the first two terms in equation (2.6), anticipating second
stage market shares as in 2.4.1.33
Proposition 2.2 User utility is maximized by the unique symmetric solution
(du, pu) = (dui , pui ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where du is characterized by
κ′(du) = −12 ν
′(du), (2.8)
while the price pu can be freely chosen to split the rent between advertisers and
platforms, resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. Aui = 1/2 and
Xui = 1/2. 34
Intuitively, the user-optimal data level balances privacy costs and reduced nuisance
benefits for users, at the margin. Note that for constant nuisance costs we get the
corner-solution where users would not provide any private data, i.e. du = 0. For
general decreasing nuisance costs, users would be willing to provide a positive level
of data du > 0.
2.4.4 Market outcome
For the market outcome, in the first stage platforms maximize their profits,
anticipating second stage market shares as in section 2.4.1.
max
pi,di
Πi (di, pi) = Ai τ(di) piXi ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (2.9)













Xi + ∂Xi∂pi Ai
. (2.11)
Intuitively, targeting benefits of data collection must equal the effects on user and
advertiser shares, at the margin. Similarly, also prices must reflect their impact on
user and advertiser shares. Regarding the curvature of the maximization problem
we note that the solution to the first-order conditions represents a maximum as
long as the targeting technology τ(·) is sufficiently concave, the nuisance cost ν(·)
33See footnote 32.
34Note that pu has to be sufficiently small such that the advertiser market remains fully covered.
The upper bound on pu can be obtained as outlined in footnote 30.
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is sufficiently convex, or both. The details of this condition are given in Appendix
2.A.2.
Proposition 2.3 There exists a (symmetric) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with











and prices per advertisement are
p∗ = 2 tatu + ν(d
∗)τ(d∗)
τ(d∗) [tu + ν(d∗)]
, (2.13)
resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. A∗i = 1/2 and X∗i = 1/2.
Comparing the market level of data provision d∗ in (2.12) to the efficient level do
in (2.7) we see that the marginal targeting benefit τ
′(d∗)
2 is additionally weighted by
ν(d∗)+tu
τ(d∗)−ta . This distortion is analzyed in detail in chapter 2.6. Note that the equilibrium
price p∗ does not exceed one and that profits are positive for all advertisers due to
Assumption 2.1.35
Before we continue we state a corollary concerning the equilibrium effect of data
provision on user utility.
Corollary 2.1 In equilibrium, κ′(d∗) > −ν ′(d∗)/2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, Corollary 2.1 implies that in equilibrium users’ data provision is such that
the (negative) privacy costs effect on user utility is larger than the (positive) effect
of reduced nuisance. Consequently, in the market outcome too much personal data
is provided compared to the user-optimal level.36
2.5 Comparative statics
In this section we want to provide economic intuition for the equilibrium results of our
model. For this we will provide comparative statics, given changes in advertiser-side
competition intensity ta and user-side competition intensity tu as well as nuisance
ν(d) and targeting τ(d) on equilibrium values of personal data provision d∗, ad-per-
click price p∗, as well as platform profits Π∗i , advertiser profits pi∗i and user utility
u∗i .
35 In Appendix 2.A.2 we provide the details for this result.
36 In section 2.6 we provide a detailed comparison of the market outcome and the user-optimal
outcome.
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As most of the comparative statics effects are in line with standard intuition from
two-sided platforms, we delegate these analyses to the Online Appendix 2.B and refer
to the table in Figure 2.1 for an overview of all derived comparative statics results.
In this section we focus on the important and seemingly counter-intuitive effects of
competition intensities of both market side.
Figure 2.1: Overview of comparative statics
z dd∗/dz dp∗/dz dΠ∗i /dz dpi∗i /dz du∗i /dz
ta + + + − −
tu + − − + −
ν(d) + + + − −
τ(d) − ? + ? +
Note that we distinguish between the platform competition intensity on the user
side and on the advertiser side. As platforms are horizontally differentiated vis-à-
vis both market sides, competition intensity on each side can be measured through
the corresponding transportation cost parameter: higher transportation costs mean
higher platform differentiation and thus higher switching costs on this market side,
which can be interpreted as more platform market power and hence lower competition
intensity.
2.5.1 Advertiser-side competition
First, we consider the effects of advertiser-side competition on data collection. For
this consider the platform’s first-order condition in equation (2.10) and note that the
data level choice depends on the effects of di on advertiser and user market shares Ai
and Xi. Regarding market share reactions we obtain ∂Xi/∂di < 0 and ∂Ai/∂di < 0
at equilibrium values.37 Intuitively, additional data provision di would shy away
users Xi because marginal privacy costs are higher than marginal benefits of reduced
nuisance (compare Corollary 2.1). Although more data provision increases targeting,
overall, advertisers would still be repelled by additional data provision because of the
detrimental effect on user market share at that platform.
In equilibrium, if competition for advertisers softens, i.e. transportation costs ta
increase, advertisers become ‘more sticky’, i.e. less sensitive to changes in data
provision (and hence user demand) such that ∂2Ai/(∂di∂ta) > 0. Contrary, users
become more sensitive to data provision such that ∂2Xi/(∂di∂ta) < 0. Overall, the
former effect dominates the latter effect in magnitude. Consequently, and recalling
X∗i = A∗i = 1/2, the right-hand-side of equation (2.10) decreases in ta such that the





37Derivations can be found in Appendix 2.A.2.
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This effect might seem counter-intuitive initially. However note that in equilibrium
platforms balance the following trade-off for the data level. On the one hand, more
data collection yields higher targeting rates, higher advertiser demand and in sum
higher profits. On the other hand, collecting more data decreases user demand,
which in turn repels advertisers and thus decreases platform profits. If competition
for advertisers softens, the latter effect is dampened more than the former effect is
strengthened. This yields a new balance of the trade-off, where more user data is
collected.
While advertiser prices p∗ rise in ta (compare Online Appendix 2.B), the effect on
user data collection d∗ does not follow ‘standard’ two-sided platform logic as here
less competition for advertisers, i.e. less sensitive advertiser demand, increases users’
data ‘payment’. Therefore, users actually benefit from increased competition on the
advertiser side, such that also du∗i /dta < 0, as discussed in the Online Appendix 2.B.
Also, since dd∗/dta > 0 and dp∗/dta > 0 we naturally have dΠ∗i /dta > 0.
2.5.2 User-side competition
Second, we evaluate the effects of user-side competition intensity on data collection.
Similar to the analysis above, we know that ∂Xi/∂di < 0 and ∂Ai/∂di < 0 in
equilibrium. If competition for users softens, i.e. transportation costs tu increase,
on the one side users become less sensitive to changes in data provision such that
∂2Xi/(∂di∂tu) > 0. Therefore, advertisers also become less sensitive to data provision
such that ∂2Ai/(∂di∂tu) > 0 because they care about the share of users on that
platforms. Therefore the right-hand-side of equation (2.10) decreases in tu such that




Two effects are intuitively relevant here. On the one hand, platforms care about the
share of users on their platform because it increases their profits directly, but also
indirectly through more attracted advertisers. On the other hand, platforms want to
increase the level of user data collected as it enhances targeting, attracts advertisers
and hence increases profits. In equilibrium, stronger competition for users impacts the
former effect of attracting users more than the latter of increasing targeting, therefore,
platforms will collect less user data. Following the same intuition, platforms would
be willing to lose some advertisers in order to not repel valuable users. Hence, also
equilibrium advertiser prices increase in tu (compare Online Appendix 2.B). Contrary
to the effects of advertiser-side competition, these results reflect the ‘standard’ two-
sided platform logic: stronger competition for users reduces the ‘price’ on the user
side, while it increases the price on the advertiser side.
Furthermore, we discuss the effect of user-side competition intensity on platform
profits. One could expect that platforms’ profit increases if competition for users
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becomes less intense, however the opposite is true. For this note that their profit
function in equilibrium is Π∗i = p∗τ(d∗) A∗i X∗i = (1/4) p∗τ(d∗). Then, a change in












On the one hand, advertiser prices decrease if competition for users becomes less
intense (tu increases), which reduces platform profits. Hence the first term on the
right-hand side of (2.16) is negative. On the other hand, the second term is positive,
because when competition for users becomes less intense (tu increases), more data
can be collected from users, which leads to more effective ad targeting and therefore
increased platform profits. As can be seen from the derivation in Appendix 2.A.2,
overall, the negative first-term effect is stronger in equilibrium, such that platforms
suffer from weaker competition for users, i.e. dΠ∗i /dtu < 0.
2.6 Policy implications
In this section we draw comparisons between the different outcomes outlined in section
2.4 and present policy implications.
2.6.1 Comparison of outcomes
First, we want to compare the outcome of the efficiency benchmark with the market
equilibrium outcome. If we compare the right-hand-side of the competitive level d∗
in (2.12) and the efficient level do in (2.7) we can see that the difference will crucially
depend on the distortion induced by
δ(d∗) := ν(d
∗) + tu
τ(d∗)− ta , (2.17)
which gives more or less weight to the marginal benefit on the advertiser market side
τ ′(d∗)/2. Note that by Assumption 2.1 the denominator of δ(d∗) is positive, such that
we have δ(d∗) > 0. As the efficient level do does not depend on parameter values, we
can see that there can be underprovision (d∗u < do) as well as overprovision (d∗o > do)
of personal data in the competitive equilibrium. Depending on the structure of the
market too much or too little weight is put on the advertiser side of the market. In
particular we can infer from equations (2.12) and (2.7) that the competitive outcome
leads to underprovision of personal data if δ(d∗) < 1 and to overprovision if δ(d∗) > 1.
Note for δ(d∗) = 1 expression (2.12) simplifies to (2.7), the efficient level of data
provision. Using our definition of δ(d∗) we can then see that d∗ < do if
δ(d∗) < 1 ⇐⇒ τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) > ta + tu (2.18)
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and d∗ > do if
δ(d∗) > 1 ⇐⇒ τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) < ta + tu. (2.19)
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 The competitive outcome leads to overprovision of personal data
if competition on both market sides is weak and/or if net cross-group externalities
are small. If competition on both market sides is strong and/or net cross-group
externalities are large, the competitive outcome exhibits underprovision of personal
data.
Proof. See Appendix.
We want to interpret this finding by first holding the functions κ(d), ν(d) and
τ(d) fixed and asking the question which competitive environment leads to which
scenario. From our comparative statics results we know that the amount of data is a
monotone function of the transportation cost parameters, i.e. dd∗dtu > 0 and
dd∗
dta > 0.
Proposition 2.4 then gives us a threshold for how the resulting level of data collection
compares to the efficient benchmark: if competition is too strong, i.e. ta+ tu is small,
platforms tend to collect and process an inefficiently small amount of data as users
and advertisers shy away too easily. If in turn competition on both sides is weak, i.e.
ta+ tu is high, the market sides become more sticky and platforms are able to extract
high amounts of personal data.
We can also hold the competitive environment ta, tu on both sides fixed and analyze
the effects of relatively strong or weak opposing cross-group externalities. On the one
hand, an additional user imposes a positive externality on advertisers (and platforms),
which is equal to the targeting effect τ(d∗). On the other hand, an additional
advertiser imposes a negative externality on users, which is equal to the nuisance
costs −ν(d∗). The net effect can therefore be interpreted as available gains from
trade in this economy. If the net effect is relatively large, there are significant gains
of trade which could be seized by increasing the amount of data collected. If the
net effect is small, the gains from trade could be increasd by lowering the amount of
collected data.
Comparing the user-optimal level du to the welfare-optimal level do we immediately
see that users would provide an inefficiently low level of data. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 The user-optimal level of data provision is inefficiently low.
The reason for this result is straightforward. As users do not internalize the effect
the data has on the advertiser market, they will provide data up to the point where
the marginal decrease in nuisance equals marginal cost of data provision. Since from
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a welfare perspective the value creation aspect on the advertiser market is omitted,
the resulting level of data provision is inefficiently low. Furthermore, since δ(d∗) > 0
we also have d∗ > du for all exogenous parameters and functional forms, as shown in
Corollary 2.1. Unlike users, platforms act as intermediaries and are able to internalize
parts of the value creation on both sides of the market.
2.6.2 Policy conclusions
In this subsection we briefly discuss what conclusions can be drawn from our previous
analyses when it comes to policy implications and regulation.
In our model, an omnipotent regulator could obviously achieve the first-best outcome
by forcing di = dj = do and increasing competition on both sides of the market such
that tu → 0 and ta → 0. In this case the efficient amount of data is provided while
the total transportation costs approach zero.
In practice, regulation and policy discussions typically focus on data and privacy
regulation or on competition policy measures (or merger regulation) to assure
competitiveness on the user side, for example in the recent Facebook case at the
BKartA or the Facebook/Whatsapp merger case in the US and the EU. In this
section we want to present answers our model provides for privacy and competition
policy, taking into account both market sides and at the same time the effect on
privacy.
Privacy regulation
Holding the competitive structure of the market fixed, the regulator could improve
upon the market outcome by enforcing the efficient level of private data provision
di = dj = do. However, a direct regulation of the amount of data in our model
requires knowledge of the cross-group externalities, i.e. functions τ(d) and ν(d), as
well as users’ privacy concerns κ(d).
A regulator could also consider switching to a consumer standard and let consumer
freely choose how much data they would like to provide. Our results show that the
user-optimal amount of data is always inefficiently low as users do not internalize
the benefit on the advertiser side. In particular our results suggest that we can
only improve in terms of welfare by switching to a consumer standard when there is
extreme overprovision of data in the economy, i.e. platforms have significant market
power on both sides of the market. If the market exhibits underprovision, switching
to the consumer standard always reduces welfare.
Competition policy
An approach which is less demanding when it comes to information requirements is
the regulation of the competitive environment on both market sides, i.e. tu and ta.
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Our results (Proposition 2.4) suggest that if competition is very weak on both sides
(tu+ ta high), the amount of data collected is likely to be inefficiently high. Similarly,
if competition is too strong (tu + ta low), too little data is provided from a welfare
point of view. While regulators still have to know whether there is overprovision
or underprovision in the market in the first place, our results can still provide some
guidance.
Our comparative statics results suggest that increasing competition works in the
same direction for both sides of the market. The equilibrium amount of data
provision is a monotone function of the transportation cost parameters ta and tu
and by altering either one of the parameters it is possible to push the competitive
equilibrium amount of data d∗ towards the welfare optimum do. Typical examples
include reducing switching costs on the user side (see e.g. GDPR/data portability
in the EU) or policing vertical integration on the advertiser side (see e.g. debate
around Google/DoubleClick acquisition). Further, our results suggest that more
competition between platforms is not necessarily welfare enhancing as it further limits
the ability to create economic value through the collection of personal data in the
case of underprovision.
Also, our results suggest that policy measures, although they work in the same
direction, are not equally effective across market sides, i.e. dd∗dta 6= dd
∗
dtu . This might be
particularly important in a scenario where the market exhibits underprovision and a
regulator would have to reduce competition as this implies increasing transportation
costs in the economy. Increasing transportation costs would then lead to more
data collection in the subsequent market outcome. Whether we can increase total
welfare by increasing transportation costs, however, depends crucially on whether
the benefit of higher and thus more efficient data provision (non linear) exceeds the
increased costs of transportation (linear).38 This trade-off could call for a second-best
regulation, where competition intensity is regulated in such a way that the amount
of data provided in the subsequent market outcome balances the above mentioned
benefits and costs at the margin.
From these results on competition policy we want to draw two main conclusions.
First, regulating competition on either or both market sides can address the privacy
and data collection distortion in the market outcome. Second, whenever regulators
consider competition policy or merger regulation in these data-driven indsutries, they
should take into account the impact on data collection in the market.
38Note that also in a situation of overprovision, the market structure might be such that it is
socially beneficial to decrease transportation costs, i.e. increase competition, even beyond the level
where it induces efficient data provision (as established in equation 2.7), such that the benefits of
decreased transportation costs outweigh the costs from data underprovision.
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2.7 Discussion
In this chapter we sketch and briefly discuss extensions and variations of the baseline
model presented in Section 2.3.
2.7.1 User prices
In this section we consider an alternative setup where platforms can charge prices
on the user side of the market. All other model specifications remain as before, i.e.
specifically users now have to pay a monetary price additional to their personal data
‘payment’. In a sense, this setup could be considered as an unrestricted model, where
platforms are not restricted to zero user prices. Let pui denote the price a user has to
pay to join platform i. User utility is then given by
ui(x) = u− κ(di)− ν(di)Ai − pui − tc|li − x|, (2.20)
while advertisers still face the same decision as in Section 2.3. Market shares are
obtained as before by pinning down indifferent users and advertisers and solving the
resulting system of equations. The resulting profit maximization problem of platform
i is then given by
max
pi,di,pci
= Aiτ(di)piXi + puiXi ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.21)
Following the same procedure as in our baseline model we obtain symmetric
equilibrium values pi = pj = p˜, pui = puj = p˜u and di = dj = d˜ where advertiser
prices are given by p˜ = 2[ta + ν(d˜)]/τ(d˜), user prices by
p˜u = ta + tc + ν(d˜)− τ(d˜), (2.22)
while the equilibrium amount of data is given by
κ′(d˜) = 12
[
τ ′(d˜)− ν ′(d˜)
]
. (2.23)
We immediately see from equations (2.7) and (2.23) that d˜ = do.
Proposition 2.6 If platforms can charge prices on both market sides, the efficient
level of data is collected.
Since platforms can now extract rents from both sides of the market, they maximize
the aggregate value, whereas in our baseline model platforms only profited on the
advertiser side of the market and hence set a data requirement level which is distorted.
Taking a closer look at equilibrium user prices in (2.22) we immediately see that
negative, positive or zero user prices are possible, depending on parameter values and
functional forms.
2.7. Discussion 51
Proposition 2.7 If user prices in the two-sided pricing model are positive, the one-
sided pricing constraint would result in data overprovision. Contrary, if user prices
are negative, this constraint would yield underprovision.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that now platforms can extract the efficient amount of
data by adequately compensating users. If net benefits of data collection are large or
competition is rather strong, platforms can extract large amounts of data from users
and then compensate them by charging negative user prices, whereas in the one-sided
pricing model platforms do not have the instrument for compensation and therefore
are forced to collect less data than the efficient level. Vice versa, if net benefits are
small or competition rather weak, platforms are not forced to monetize through ads
by extracting an inefficiently high amount of data, but can obtain positive revenue
from the user side instead and leave the amount of data at the efficient level.
We would like to mention at this point that this result may depend on the fact that
even with positive user prices we assume the user market to remain fully covered.
However, remember that under a market solution with overprovision users gain in
terms of utility by decreasing d from d∗ to do. If this difference in utility is enough
to cover the associated positive user price, the user market remains covered. If the
consumer price exceeds the utility gain, the two-sided pricing may lead to users leaving
the market and efficiency may not be feasible any longer. We provide a more detailed
discussion of the full market coverage assumption in the subsequent section. A similar
argument can also be made if we consider heterogeneous users as then our uniform
pricing setup may not be sufficient to ensure efficiency but platforms would need to
engage in price discrimination.
Nevertheless, we would like to draw two further conclusions from these results. Firstly,
observing a user price p˜u = 0 empirically is consistent with the equilibrium result
above as well as with our baseline model. By observing zero prices we can not infer
whether a price of zero is an optimal choice, making the model above the ’correct’
model, or whether there are constraints which prevent platforms from setting user
prices at all, making our baseline model more suitable. Secondly, since user prices
depend on parameters of competition intensity and externalities, observing zero prices
across different markets, jurisdictions and industry sectors makes it unlikely that
p˜u = 0 is a profit maximizing choice in all cases. This strongly supports the argument
made by Waehrer (2015) that user prices are not a (practical) variable of interest in
real-world platform maximization problems.
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2.7.2 Collusion
Full collusion
Let us consider a collusive game where platforms agree on prices pi = pj = p
and data requirements di = dj = d such that joint profits are maximized. Since
advertisers face transportation costs, the profit maximizing collusive price is such
that the participation constraint of the indifferent advertiser is binding pii(1/2) = 0
which yields p = 1− ta/τ(d). Plugging the collusive price p into the platforms’ profit
functions (2.3) we obtain Πi = (τ(d) − ta)/4 and immediately see that profits are
increasing in d up to the point where the participation constraint of the indifferent
user binds d : ui(1/2) = 0. Since we assumed u to be high enough to have interior
solutions in the previous sections, we can infer that the collusive amount of data will
be excessively high.
Partial collusion
In this section we consider an alternative collusive environment where platforms
coordinate on setting a symmetric level of data d but still compete in prices on the
advertiser market. The idea is that platforms might influence privacy regulation
in a collusive effort without coordinating their pricing decisions. We therefore
introduce a collusive stage where platforms agree on a symmetric level d prior to
the price setting decision. It is easy to verify that symmetric prices are then given
by pi = pj = p(d) ≡ 2 (tatu + ν(d)τ(d)) / (τ(d) [tu + ν(d)]), similar to the market
outcome outlined in section 2.4. The key difference, however, is the collusive choice
of d. As prices (and d) are symmetric, market shares can be anticipated to be given
by Ai = Aj = Xi = Xj = 1/2 such that industry wide platform profits are given by
Π(d) := Πi(d) + Πj(d) = τ(d)p(d)/2.
If we have Π′(d) > 0 for all d, the collusive level will be the same as in full collusion
case, such that the participation constraint of the users will be binding, and if Π′(d) =
0 has a solution, a possible interior solution exists. The comparison to the market
outcome (or to the efficient outcome) is in this case, however, ambiguous and depends
on functional forms and parameter values.
Interestingly, industry profits are not necessarily increasing in d. In fact if Π′(d) =
p(d)τ ′(d) + p′(d)τ(d) < 0 for all d then the collusive level of data will be zero. The
reason for this seemingly counter-intuitive result is that increasing d can effectively
propagate competition on the advertiser market. In particular if we go back to the
definition of advertiser market shares in (2.5) we can see that increasing a symmetric
level d has the same effect on the advertiser market as a decrease in transportation
costs in the sense that it makes advertisers more reactive towards changes in prices.
The intuition is straightforward: if the click-probability is very high, small differences
in prices become magnified. The trade-off faced by the platforms is then the following.
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An increase in click probability (through increasing d) results in tighter competition
on the ad market (depressing p). The optimal d can therefore vary widely depeneding
on which effect dominates.
To briefly summarize this section we can conclude that full collusion amongst
platforms should be avoided whenever possible. When it comes to partial collusion,
however, a more nuanced analysis is necessary as competition on the ad market might
be sufficiently strong to prevent inefficient regulatory capture.
2.7.3 Market coverage and multi-homing
In this section we want to briefly discuss the effects of relaxing the assumptions
guaranteeing full market coverage and single-homing. We consider market-coverage
and multi-homing together because without these assumptions in both cases the
market share of a platform is determined by the user/advertiser who is indifferent
between joining a platform and the outside option, whereas in the baseline model
it was determined by the user/advertiser who is indifferent between joining both
platforms. Note that this changes the interpretation of transportation costs in the
model substantially. While in the baseline model transportation costs measured
a restriction to switching to the other platform and hence a degree of platform
competition, now they rather exhibit a restraint on a platform’s demand, independent
of the other platform. Essentially, lower transportation costs can now be interpreted
as more elastic demand, whereas in the baseline model they reflected less elastic
(sticky) demand. While our assumptions for the baseline model were chosen to
study full competition between platforms, relaxing the assumptions on one market
side significantly changes the setting in the sense that platforms now only compete
indirectly through the other market side. Nevertheless, we want to provide some
intuition for the robustness of our results. For a more detailed analysis consider the
Online Appendix 2.B.
Advertiser side
On the advertiser side, lifting Assumption 2.1 of a covered market together with the
single-homing assumption can result in two cases, depending on parameters. First,
if transportation costs ta are sufficiently small, some advertisers ’in the middle’ will
use both platform (multi-homing). The comparison of the new equilibrium level of
data provision to the new efficient level or the baseline level of data provision is,
however, ambiguous. This is because less advertiser demand elasticity on the one
hand could allow firms to readjust d, while at the same time the total number
of advertisers on a platform could rise. From an efficiency perspective, though,
more data should be collected than was efficient in the baseline model. Second,
if transportation costs ta are sufficiently high, some advertisers in the middle might
choose not to use any platform (no full market coverage). Then it would also be
efficient to exclude some advertisers such that the new efficient level of data provision
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is below the efficient baseline level. The comparison to the equilibrium outcomes
remains however ambiguous, as above.
User side
On the user side, relaxing the full-market Assumption 2.2 and the single-homing
constraint similarly leads to either some users ’in the middle’ joining both platforms
(multi-homing) or some user joining neither platform (no full market coverage),
depending mainly on transportation costs tu. In both cases user demand is then
merely scaled by the demand elasticity, i.e. the transportation costs tu, and users’ role
essentially reduces to being a resource of data needed to create advertising surplus.39
We find that there would always be over-provision of user data in equilibrium because
the efficient benchmark takes into account the trade-off between total value creation
and user exclusion, whereas the market outcome only balances targeting benefits and
potential user exclusion. However, still less data is collected than in the baseline
model and also the efficient level of data decreases. Further, we find that now
the transportation costs parameters have no effect on the equilibrium level of data
provision. This is because tu merely scales demand while the relevant trade-off for
the choice of d involves the actual utility when joining the platform and is not
influenced by the demand scale. Furthermore, equilibrium prices now increase in
tu and decrease in ta. Because of the reversed role transportation costs now play,
this is not contradictory to the baseline model results: the harder it is to keep users,
the higher the price for advertisers. Consequently, platform profits still increase and
advertiser profits still decrease in user-side elasticity.
2.7.4 Positive cross-group externalities
In the baseline model we considered the case where users incur nuisance cost from
seeing ads on the platform, i.e. a negative cross-group externality incured by users.
As explained in the beginning we consider this case because we think it illustrates the
main results in a very intuitive way. What we demonstrate in the Online Appendix
2.B is that the model can in fact be generalized to have positive cross-group effects
in both directions while the major results remain unchanged.
2.8 Conclusion
We analyze the role of competition intensity in a two-sided market framework where
platforms collect data from users and monetize through ad-sales. Our model predicts
that the equilibrium amount of collected data will be distorted compared to the
welfare efficient benchmark. Depending on the net effect of cross-group externalities
and the competition intensity on both sides of the market, the distortion can lead
39Note that on the advertiser side this was not the case because advertisers pay money rather than
a value-creating resource.
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to underprovision or overprovision of personal data. Since the level of collected data
increases the more market power platforms have on either side of the market, side
specific regulations are substitutable. We also show that a consumer standard would
always lead to underprovision of data as users do not internalize improvements in the
targeting capabilities. Lastly, we showed that two-sided pricing induces platforms to
choose the efficient level of data by adequately compensating users.
While we think our model provides useful insights we would also like to discuss some
limitations. It would be interesting to further explore the role of multi-homing on
the advertiser side as it changes the competitive dynamics substantially. Secondly,
one could alter the setting on the user side and consider heterogeneous users, while
platforms engage in second degree discrimination by offering a menu of data choices.
We think those are interesting avenues for future research.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Omitted analysis
Second stage market shares
Note that equations (2.4) - (2.5) are consistent, non-redundant and linear in Xi,Xj ,Ai
and Aj such that the resulting solution in (2.4.1) is unique. Explicit market shares
are then given by:
Xi =
ta(2κ(dj)− 2κ(di) + ν(dj)− ν(di) + 2tu) + (1− pj)τ(dj)(ν(di) + ν(dj))
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Xj =
ta(2κ(di)− 2κ(dj) + ν(di)− ν(dj) + 2tu) + (1− pi)τ(di)(ν(di) + ν(dj))
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Ai =
(1− pi)τ(di)(κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj) + tu)− (1− pj)τ(dj)(κ(di)− κ(dj)− ν(dj) + tu) + 2tatu
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Aj = 1
− (1− pi)τ(di)(κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj) + tu)− (1− pj)τ(dj)(κ(di)− κ(dj)− ν(dj) + tu) + 2tatu4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Second order conditions
In the following we derive sufficient conditions such that the equilibrium values p∗, d∗
derived from the maximization problem presented in section 2.3 characterize a local








u τ(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)
4(tu − ν(d∗))2(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)




< 0, a necessary condition for the Hessian to
be negative definite. In the next steps we argue that we can always find functions
τ(·), ν(·) such that det(H)|d∗,p∗ > 0. First, it is helpful to look at the numerator and
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where the numerator Hnum and the denominator Hden are given by
Hnum = τ(d∗)2
[
−4t2u(ta − τ(d∗))(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)
(
ν′′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + τ ′′(d∗)(ν(d∗) + tu)
)
−t2uν′(d∗)2(ta − τ(d∗))3 − τ ′(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)2
(
ν(d∗)(ν(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + 4tcτ(d∗)) + 4tat2u
)
+2tuν(d∗)ν′(d∗)τ ′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗))2(ν(d∗) + tu)
]
Hden = 64(ta − τ(d∗))(tu − ν(d∗))2(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)2










H1num = −4t2u(ta − τ(d∗))(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu) > 0
H2num = (ta − τ(d∗)) < 0
H3num = (ν(d∗) + tu) > 0
H4num = −t2uν′(d∗)2(ta − τ(d∗))3 ≥ 0
H5num = −τ ′(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)2
(
ν(d∗)(ν(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + 4tuτ(d∗)) + 4tat2u
)
≶ 0
H6num = 2tuν(d∗)ν′(d∗)τ ′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗))2(ν(d∗) + tu) ≤ 0
we can see that requiring Hnum < 0 is equivalent to the condition
− 1
H1num
(H4num +H5num +H6num) > H2numν ′′(d∗) +H3numτ ′′(d∗)
where LHS ≶ 0 while RHS < 0 due to our functional requirements on τ(·) and ν(·).
The important thing to realize is that, firstly, the condition for negative definiteness
reduces to a condition which is linear in ν ′′(d∗) and τ ′′(d∗), the curvature information
of the targeting and the nuisance functions, and secondly, is given by an upper bound.
If the sign of the upper bound is positive then this condition is always fulfilled as we
have RHS < 0. Only if the sign of the upper bound is negative, the condition
may bind. But then we can assume that τ(·) is sufficiently concave and/or ν(·) is
sufficiently convex such that this condition holds since for our results we only require
τ ′′(·) < 0 and ν ′′(·) ≥ 0 which is in line with this condition.
Market outcome
In equilibrium p∗ < 1 and pi∗i (a) ≥ 0. To see this note that given equation (2.13),
p∗ < 1 if
2 tatu + ν(d
∗)τ(d∗)
τ(d∗)tu + ν(d∗)τ(d∗)




By Assumption 2.1 we have that τ(d) > ta for all d and therefore in particular also
τ(d∗) > ta. Further, we have that 0 < (tu − ν(d∗)) /2tu < 1, hence the last inequality.
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Thus, Assumption 2.1 is sufficient for the expression above to hold and p∗ < 1.









− ta2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ τ(d




which is guaranteed by Assumption 2.1 for all d and especially for d∗. For this note
that the term on the left in the last inequality is increasing in d.
2.A.2 Omitted proofs
Proofs of propositions & corollaries
Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. Rearranging terms in the first-order condition of platform profit maximization,
given by equation (2.12), yields 2κ′(d∗) + ν ′(d∗) = τ ′(d∗)ν(d
∗)+tu
τ(d∗)−ta . By Assumption 2.1
we have τ(d∗) > ta. Hence the right hand side is positive, such that 2κ′(d∗)+ν ′(d∗) >
0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. The proof relies on the monotonicity of the LHS and RHS in equations (2.7)
and (2.12). Suppose, δ(d∗) > 1 but d∗ < do and hence κ′(d∗) < κ′(do). Using the
implicit definition of do in (2.7) and d∗ in (2.12) this implies δ(d∗)τ ′(d∗) − ν ′(d∗) <
τ ′(do) − ν ′(do). Rearranging yields δ(d∗) < τ ′(do)τ ′(d∗) + ν
′(d∗)−ν′(do)
τ ′(d∗) . But due to
the curvature of τ(·), ν(·) we have τ ′(do)τ ′(d∗) < 1 and ν
′(d∗)−ν′(do)
τ ′(d∗) ≤ 0 for d∗ < do,





τ ′(d∗) . For d
∗ > do we then have τ
′(do)
τ ′(d∗) > 1 and
ν′(d∗)−ν′(do)
τ ′(d∗) ≥ 0
and hence δ(d∗) > 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof. To see that positive user prices in the two-sided model correspond to data
overprovision in the one-sided pricing model, note that user prices are positive
in the two-sided pricing model if τ(do) − ν(do) < ta + tu. From Proposition
2.4 we know that in the one-sided pricing model too little data is provided if
ta + tu < τ(d∗) − ν(d∗). But this would mean that d∗ < do, which contradicts
τ(do)− ν(do) < ta + tu < τ(d∗)− ν(d∗), as τ(d) is increasing and ν(d) decreasing in
d. Hence it can only be that in the one-sided model there is overprovision, such that
d∗ > do and τ(do)− ν(do) < τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) < ta + tu.
To see that negative user prices in the two-sided model correspond to data
underprovision in the one-sided pricing model, note that user prices are negative
in the two-sided pricing model if τ(do) − ν(do) > ta + tu. From Proposition 2.4 we
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know that too much data is provided if ta + tu > τ(d∗)− ν(d∗). But this would mean
that d∗ > do, which contradicts τ(do) − ν(do) > ta + tu > τ(d∗) − ν(d∗). Hence it
must be that in the one-sided model there is underprovision, such that d∗ < do and
τ(do)− ν(do) > τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) > ta + tu.
Proofs for comparative statics






= −{tatu + ν(d
∗) [tap∗ + (1− p∗)τ(d∗)]} τ ′(d∗)






= − (1− p
∗) [tatu + ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] τ ′(d∗)
4 [τ(d∗)− ta] [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] < 0, (2.27)
because τ ′(d∗) > 0 , while τ(d∗) > ta by Assumption 2.1 and p∗ < 1 as established in







= − (1− p
∗)ν(d∗) [tatu + ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] τ ′(d∗)








∗)tu [tatu + ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] τ ′(d∗)






= ta {tatu + ν(d
∗) [tap∗ + (1− p∗)τ(d∗)]} τ ′(d∗)







∗)τ(d∗) {tatu + ν(d∗) [tap∗ + (1− p∗)τ(d∗)]} τ ′(d∗)











∗) [tu + ν(d∗)] [tatu + ν(d∗)] τ ′(d∗)
4 [τ(d∗)− ta] [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] > 0.
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[tu + ν(d∗)]2 Ψ(d∗)
[
(tu + ν(d∗)) ν ′(d∗)τ ′(d∗)
− ν(d∗) {(τ(d∗)− ta) [κ′′(d) + ν ′′(d∗)]− tc (tu + ν(d∗)) τ ′′(d∗)}]
< 0,




2κ′′(d∗) + ν ′′(d∗)
]
(τ(d∗)− ta)2 − ν ′(d∗)τ ′(d∗) (τ(d∗)− ta) (2.28)
+ (ν(d∗) + tu)
[
τ ′(d∗)2 − (τ(d∗)− ta) τ ′′(d∗)
]
> 0.
Note for the inequalities that τ ′(d∗) > 0, τ ′′(d∗) < 0 while ν ′(d∗) ≤ 0, ν ′′(d∗) ≥ 0 by
construction, and τ(d∗) > ta by Assumption 2.1.
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2.B Online Appendix
In this online appendix we will provide derivations and intuition for comparative
statics not covered in the main text. Further, we present extensions to our baseline
model where we consider multi-homing, elastic total demand and positive cross-group
externalities.
Comparative static effects on prices in equilibrium
For this analysis consider the platform’s first-order condition in equation (2.11) and
note that the price depends indirectly on the effects of pi on advertiser and user
















4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)] < 0, (2.30)
because p∗ < 1 as established in Appendix 2.A.2.
Competition for advertisers
Note that in Section 2.5 we discussed that lower advertiser-side competition intensity
increases the level of data collection in equilibrium, i.e. dd∗/dta > 0. Here we analyze
the effects of competition intensity for advertisers on p∗. Differentiating (2.29) with





























= tu [tu + ν(d
∗)] τ(d∗)
4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)]2
> 0.
If competition for advertisers softens, i.e. transportation costs ta increase,
advertisers become less sensitive to changes in prices such that ∂2Ai/(∂pi∂ta) > 0.
Consequently, users become more sensitive to prices (which repel advertisers) such
that ∂2Xi/(∂pi∂ta) < 0. Overall, the former effect dominates the latter effect in
magnitude. Consequently, and as X∗i = A∗i = 1/2, the right-hand-side of equation
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Intuitively, higher advertiser transportation costs mean more sticky advertisers and
hence decreased platform competition for advertisers. Therefore, it is straightforward
that advertiser prices rise, which is line with standard intuition.
Competition for users
In section 2.5 we discussed that lower competition intensity for users decreases
platforms’ equilibrium level of data collection, i.e. dd∗/dtu > 0. Here we analyze
the effects of competition intensity for users on p∗. Differentiating (2.29) with respect















= − (1− p
∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)2
4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)]2
< 0.
If competition for users softens, i.e. transportation costs tu increase, users become
less sensitive to changes in prices such that ∂2Xi/(∂pi∂tu) < 0. Consequently,
advertisers, too, become less sensitive to prices (which now repel less users) such
that ∂2Xi/(∂di∂tu) < 0. Therefore the right-hand-side of equation (2.11) decreases




Again, this is in line with standard platform intuition: advertiser prices fall if the
user side becomes less sensitive (elastic).
Nuisance
First, we consider the effects of nuisance on data collection.40 Totally differentiating
the first-order conditions from equations (2.12) and (2.13) w.r.t. ν(d) and solving for
dd∗/dν(d) yields
40Note that nuisance is a function in our model. To assess an increase in nuisance we treat it
as fixed and consider an upward shift, without changing any curvature. For this we slightly abuse
notation to stay consistent with the rest of our comparative statics, such that e.g. by dd∗/dν(d)|d=d∗
we intuitively consider the effect of adding a positive constant c to the function, i.e. ν(d) + c where
c > 0, on d∗.






∗)− ta) τ ′(d∗)
Ψ(d∗) > 0. (2.33)
Second, we evaluate the effects of nuisance on p∗. Solving for dp∗/dν(d) and dropping





=−2tu (ta − τ)
2 [τ (τ ′′ (ν + tu)− (τ − ta) (2κ′′ + ν ′′))− (ν + tu) τ ′2]
(ν + tu) τ2 Ψ(d∗)
> 0,
(2.34)
where Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (2.28). Intuitively, higher (absolute) nuisance
results in lower user demand. To counterbalance this effect, platforms would increase
ad prices as ads become relatively less attractive. Additionally, more user data would
be collected in order to soften the nuisance increase. Interpreted from the point of
view of users, they are now willing to incur marginally more privacy costs in order to
obtain some nuisance reduction.
Targeting







∗) + tu) τ ′(d∗)
Ψ(d∗) < 0. (2.35)
Second, we evaluate the effects of nuisance on p∗. Solving for dp∗/dτ(d) and dropping





=2tu (τ − ta) [τ
′′ (ν + tu) ta − (τ − ta) [ν ′τ ′ + ta (2κ′′ + ν ′′)]]
(ν + tu) τ2Ψ(d∗)
≷ 0. (2.36)
platforms to create the same ad value with less personal data, hence in equilibrium
platforms will compete to ‘relax’ the data requirement for users. Two effects are
relevant for the effect on ad prices. On the one hand ads become more valuable,
hence platforms might increase the price, i.e. their share, of this value (intensive
margin). On the other hand, platforms might prefer to attract more of these valuable
advertisers by reducing the ad price (extensive margin). Overall, the effect on ad
prices depends on which of the opposing effects is stronger.
41Note that targeting is a function, which we treat as fixed here, such that comparative statics are
performed as described in footnote 40.
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Comparative static effects on platform profits, advertiser profits and
user utility
In this subsection we provide further intuition on equilibrium profits and utility by
presenting comparative statics.
Effects on platform profits














We look at the effects of advertiser competition intensity. For z = ta both terms on the
right-hand side are positive and hence dΠ∗i /dta > 0. Intuitively, when competition for
advertisers becomes more intense (ta decreases), then prices for ad-placing decrease.
In turn, less data is collected from users, such that targeting becomes less effective,
and less total revenue is made on the ad market. Both these effects decrease platform
profits.
The intensity of user-side competition increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dtu < 0.
This effect is discussed in the main text in section 2.5.
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dν(d) > 0.
More data is collected, which increases targeting and hence the (residual) value of
a placed ad, thus also higher prices can be sustained. Overall, this unambiguously
benefits platforms.
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dτ(d) >
0. Although less data is collected, the absolute externality of users, i.e. targeting,
increases the value to be shared between platforms and advertisers. While the effect




(tu + ν(d∗)) Ψ(d∗)





κ′′(d) + ν ′′(d∗)
]− tc (tu + ν(d∗)) τ ′′(d∗)}] > 0, (2.38)
where dd∗/dtu is from equation (2.15), while Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (2.28).
Effects on advertiser profits
The effects on advertiser profits
pi∗i (a) = (1− p∗) τ(d∗)X∗i − ta|li − a|
= 12 (1− p
∗) τ(d∗)− ta|li − a|















− |li − a|dtadz . (2.39)
Stronger competition for advertisers (lower z = ta) makes advertisers overall better
off, i.e. dpi∗i /dta < 0. However, there are multiple effects at work. Firstly, prices fall,
such that the first term on the right hand side increases. Secondly, less personal
data from users can be collected, which makes targeting less effective, therefore
the second term is negative. Thirdly, also transportation costs decrease, which
increases advertiser profits. Overall, the price and transportation cost reduction

















(τ(d∗)− ta) + tc
(




= − 14 [tu + ν(d∗)] Ψ(d∗)
{
−ν′(d∗) (tu + ν(d∗)) (τ(d∗)− ta) τ ′(d∗) + 3 (tu + ν(d∗))2 τ ′(d∗)2
− (5tu + ν(d∗)) (τ(d∗)− ta)
[
−ν′′(d∗) (τ(d∗)− ta) + (tu + ν(d∗)) τ ′′(d∗)
]}
< 0, (2.40)
where dd∗/dta is from equation (2.14), while Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (2.28).
Stronger competition for users (increase z = tu) hurts advertisers, hence dpiAi /dtu > 0.
The platforms’ bottleneck position allows them to increase prices (negative first term)
and, further, less user data can be collected, such that targeting becomes less effective
(negative second term).
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) decreases advertisers’ surplus, i.e. dpiAi /dν(d) <
0. Although more data is collected, which increases targeting and hence the value of a
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< 0, (2.41)
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) has an ambiguous effect on advertisers’ surplus.
While the targeting function becomes better, less data needs be collected which again
reduces targeting effectiveness. Further, the effect on prices is ambiguous. Hence,
overall effects on advertiser surplus remain unclear.
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Effects on user utility
The effects on a user’s utility u∗i (x) = u− κ(d∗)− ν(d∗)A∗i − tu|li − x| = u− κ(d∗)−










− dtudz |li − x|. (2.42)
Note that by Corollary 2.1 the term in brackets on the right-hand side is positive and
that for z ∈ {ta, tu} we have dd∗/dz > 0 such that dui/dz < 0.
Intuitively, less competition for advertisers (higher z = ta) increases the amount of
data collected in equilibrium, which overall leaves users worse off, as privacy concerns
are increased, although ads are more targeted and hence nuisance smaller.
Less competition for users (higher z = tu) increases the amount of data collected,
such that privacy concerns are increased, although it reduces nuisance costs. Further
strengthened by increased transportation costs for users, quite naturally users’ utility
overall decreases.
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) decreases users’ utility, i.e. dui/dν(d) < 0
because again more data is collected.
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) increases users’ utility, i.e. dui/dτ(d) < 0.
Although targeting does not directly affect users, less data is collected, which is
beneficial for users.
Market coverage and multi-homing
Advertiser side
We start this section by lifting Assumption 2.1 for full market coverage and the single-
homing assumption for advertisers. Analytically, this is achieved by pinning down
advertisers which are indifferent between joining a platform and abstaining such that











Figure 2.2: Relaxed advertiser market assumption
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Figure 2.2 shows two potential outcomes of this alternative setup. In the first case the
total mass of participating advertisers in the market is smaller than 1 while advertisers
’in the middle’ choose not to participate as their transportation costs are too high.
In the second case the sets of advertisers joining platform i and j are overlapping
such that advertisers ’in the middle’ join both platforms, i.e. they multi-home. The
remaining analysis follows the steps from the baseline model and is omitted at this
point.
The welfare maximizing level of data doa is then given by
κ′(doa) = Aoi (doa)τ ′(doa)−Aoi (doa)ν ′(doa) (2.43)
where Aoi (d) denotes the symmetric mass of advertisers on each platform and is
given by Aoi (d) = [τ(d) − ν(d)]/(2ta). The equilibrium level of data under platform









τ ′(d∗a)−A∗i (d∗a)ν ′(d∗a) (2.44)
while A∗i (d∗a) = [(1 − p∗a(d∗a))τ(d∗a)]/(2ta). We can see immediately that whether the
resulting allocation is an equilibrium with multi-homing or with excluded advertisers
depends on functional forms and parameters. We will therefore discuss the two cases
separately in the following.
Assume transport costs ta are sufficiently low to allow a multi-homing allocation
of advertisers under the efficient benchmark, i.e. Aoi (doa) > 1/2. Comparing the
condition for the resulting efficient level of data provision to our baseline condition in
(2.12) we see that doa > do, under multihoming the efficient level of data provision is
higher than under single-homing. The idea is that additional advertisers are attracted
in order to maximize total value creation in the economy. The comparison of the new
competitive level of data provision d∗a to the new efficiency benchmark as well as to
our baseline model is, however, ambiguous. As competition for advertisers is now
relaxed, platforms might not be forced to offer high levels of d to attract additional
advertisers. At the same the value creation aspect from a larger total number of
advertisers is still valid, such that the net effect on the level of data provision remains
ambiguous.
When transportation costs ta are sufficiently large, some advertisers ’in the middle’
would not join any platform, such that Aoi (doa) < 1/2 and also A∗i (d∗a) < 1/2. Note
that the efficient level is then also lower than in our benchmark doa < do as attracting
advertisers becomes relatively expensive and it becomes more efficient to exclude some
advertisers than to offer very high levels of d. The comparison to the market outcome,
however, remains ambiguous. While the same efficiency argument applies, platforms
also have an additional incentive to increase their intensive margin by increasing d
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to offset the reduction in advertising demand. Again, depending on functional forms
either effect may dominate.
User side
Similarly on the user side, by relaxing Assumption 2.2 it is possible that u becomes
sufficiently small relative to transportation costs, such that users ’in the middle’ prefer
to abstain from both platforms. If u is sufficiently large relative to transportation
costs, users ’in the middle’ might choose to join both platforms. In both cases user
market shares are determined through the utility of the indifferent user relative to
the outside option.
The symmetric welfare-maximizing level of data dou is then given by
κ′(dou) = Xoi (dou)
tu





where Xoi (dou) denotes the symmetric mass of users on each platform and is given by
Xoi (dou) = [2u− 2κ(dou)− ν(dou)]/(2tu). The equilibrium level of data under platform
competition d∗u is then given by







while X∗i (d∗u) = [2u − 2κ(d∗u) − ν(d∗u)]/(2tu). From this we can immediately see
that d∗u > dou, i.e. there is always over-provision of user data. While the efficient
benchmark takes into account the tradeoff between excluding users and total value
creation, the market outcome only compares the targeting benefit to the exclusion
of users. Further note that if the market is not covered such that Xi(du) < 1/2, the
efficient as well as the equilibrium level of data provision is lower than in the baseline
model, i.e. dou < do and d∗u < d∗ because tu/τ(d) < δ(d) ∀d.
It is worthwhile to note that under user multi-homing as well as under relaxed user
market coverage we get that dd∗u/dtu = dd∗u/dta = 0, i.e. the transportation cost
parameters on either market side are irrelevant for the equilibrium (and also the
efficient) level of data collection. This is because tu now merely scales demand while
the relevant trade-off for the choice of d involves the actual utility from joining the
platform, which is unaffected by the demand scale.
Under this setup user demand becomes more elastic than in the baseline model which
undermines platforms’ incentive to increase d. At the same time platforms would
also increase prices dp∗u/dtu > 0 if it becomes increasingly difficult to attract users.
Note that we seemingly found the opposite effect in our baseline model dp∗/dtu < 0,
however, the interpretation of tu changes substantially such that the two results do
not contradict each other: the harder it is to keep users, the higher the prices for
advertisers.
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In fact platforms are able to overcompensate the reduction in user demand such that
dΠ∗u/dtu > 0 (and for advertisers dpi∗u/dtu < 0). Again, as the interpretation of tu
essentially reverses, we had the opposite results in our baseline model where platform
profits decreased in tu (while advertiser profits increased). This is also reflected in
the effect on the advertiser side where equilibrium prices rise in ta under both model
specifications, i.e. dp∗u/dta > 0 as the interpretation remains identical.
Positive cross-group externalities
Consider the following modification of the users’ utility function:
ui(x) = u− κ(di) + ρ(di)Ai − tu|li − x|. (2.47)
The concave and twice-differentiable function ρ(d) represents the relevance from a
user’s point of view of seeing Ai offers, where ρ′(d) ≥ 0 and ρ′′(d) ≤ 0. However, ρ(d)
can now be entirely negative, positive or might even switch signs. The first case is
discussed in depth in the main paper, where we consider the case ρ(d) = −ν(d). The
second case, a strictly positive effect, can be thought of as a traditional ‘dating’ model,
where one group strictly enjoys the presence of the other group. The last case can be
thought of as a more nuanced version of our nuisance cost in the baseline model. While
for low values of d, i.e. the platform has very little information about the consumer,
a user dislikes the interaction with the other market side, the interaction might turn
out to be valuable once the platform has sufficient information, i.e. d is sufficiently
large. A typical example would be the recommendation system on Amazon. While
it is debatable, whether Amazon is a two-sided market in the traditional sense, the
product recommendation system might serve as a useful example. A new customer
might see all kind of product recommendations, some of which are completely useless
to the user and are just a waste of attention. However, once Amazon has acquired
sufficient information about the user’s preferences through analyzing the purchasing
and browsing history, the recommendations become more personalized, and the user
finds actual value in looking through them.
From a modelling perspective we only require that the relevance is monotonically
increasing in the amount of data, but with decreasing returns. Since the curvature
of the maximization problem therefore remains unchanged, the characterization of
the second order conditions given in the Appendix 2.A.2 also remain qualitatively
unchanged. The absolute value of the function ρ(d) is in the end of minor importance
regarding the key mechanics of the model, however, it has to be taken care of through
appropriately adjusting the modelling assumptions. In order to assure full market
coverage on the offer side, we now have the following set of assumptions.
Assumption 2.3 Competition for advertisers is sufficiently strong, i.e. ta ≤ t¯a.
For this, it is necessary that competition for users is sufficiently weak and that there
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are gains of trade for all advertisers, even without data collection, i.e.
(a) tu > |ρ(0)|, ρ(d) < tu
(b) ta < τ(0)
The upper bound on ta is then given by t¯a := tuτ(0)+ρ(0)τ(0)3tu−ρ(0) . Since now net
cross-group externalities might be positive, a problem of platform tipping must
be taken into account. In particular the following assumption ensures that the
competitive symmetric equilibrium leads to positive prices (and therefore positive
platform profits), such that a platform would not be indifferent whether to enter the
market if just one platform serves the entire market.
Assumption 2.4 To ensure market participation of both platforms it is necessary to
have
tatu > ρ(·)τ(·).
Note that for negative ρ(·) as in our main model, this assumption is always fulfilled
as then the RHS is always negative, while the LHS is always positive. Accordingly,
if ρ(·) switches signs, the range in which ρ(·) is negative is unproblematic. Therefore
the only potentially problematic case is if ρ(·) is positive or can turn positive since it
further restricts the parameter space in addition to the previous assumption.42 Given
that both assumptions are satisfied, the analysis is analogous to our main model and
all major results still hold.
42In the following we sketch a set of conditions under which both assumptions would be satisfied.
Note Assumption 2.4 specifies a lower bound ta > ta with ta ≡ 1tu ρ(·)τ(·). It is therefore necessary
to show that the set of ta satisfying Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4 is non-empty. In particular, if it holds
that limd→∞ta < t¯a we can always find intermediate values of ta satisfying both conditions. For this






Based on Sudaric (2018).
3.1 Introduction
The recent years showed a steep increase in the volume and number of projects
financed through crowdfunding (CF). Beginning with the rise of the first online CF
platforms in the early 2000s the market for CF has been estimated to reach USD 34
billion in 2015 (Massolution, 2015). Compared to USD 148 billion of venture capital
financing (EY, 2016), CF can be seen as a growing but serious addition to the pool
of available entrepreneurial financing sources.
In this paper we want to focus on the so called ‘reward-based’ CF following an ‘all-or-
nothing’ approach. In this framework consumers pledge towards reaching a funding
target. If the amount of total pledges (P ) exceeds the target level (T ) the campaign is
successful. In this case the entrepreneur obtains P , makes the necessary investments,
and delivers the reward, usually the product itself, to all project backers. If the target
is not reached (P < T ), the campaign is unsuccessful. In this case no transactions
take place (all-or-nothing) and all project backers are refunded.
From the perspective of an entrepreneur this assures that the investment decision
is ex-post efficient, which highlights the screening capabilities of a CF mechanism
to condition on states of the world where demand is proven to be high enough to
make a certain investment worthwhile. Another often attributed advantage of CF is
the possibility of market surveying as by observing the outcome of the CF campaign,
entrepreneurs can learn about underlining market characteristics and thereby improve
future business decisions.
From the consumer perspective there may be concerns whether the project will be
successfully funded, and if so, whether the entrepreneur delivers the promised reward
and whether the quality is as expected. There might also be concerns whether the
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entrepreneur moves towards regular sales at different prices after a successful CF
campaign.43 Consumers therefore have to take into account at what conditions they
might be able to obtain the product in the future, if they decide not to secure the
product through participating in the CF. The last aspect will be the focus of this
paper, where we try to better understand demand dynamics in CF campaigns when
consumers anticipate future sales.
The following figure depicts the funding outcome of 4.069 CF campaigns in the
category ‘video games’ on one of the major CF platforms Kickstarter from the period
2009 - 2017.44 The vertical axis depicts the ratio P/T , i.e. to what extent the project
reached its funding threshold such that a ratio P/T ≥ 1 implies that the project has
been successful and potentially over funded, while a ratio P/T < 1 means that the
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of funding outcomes for video games
Of the depicted campaigns roughly 75 percent did not reach the funding target.
Interestingly, we see that the majority of those campaigns has a funding ratio of below
0.5 while only few projects ended with funding ratios of 0.5 < P/T < 1. Similarly,
among the 25 percent of successful projects we also observe a skewed distribution,
with the majority of successful campaigns having a funding ratio close to one. In the
following we want to focus on the second point in more detail.
43Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) report that 90 percent of successfully funded ventures remained
ongoing 1-4 years after the campaign, suggesting that it is reasonable for consumers to consider the
possibility of purchasing the product after the CF campaign.
44The data has been obtained from the twelve crawling attempts in 2017 available on https:
//webrobots.io/kickstarter-datasets/. We depict finished funding campaigns from the ‘video
games’ category with a target level T ≥ 10.000 USD and pledge level P > 0 USD resulting in 4.069
funding campaigns. We restrict the illustration to the ‘video games’ category as it is one of the
largest product categories on Kickstarter.
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Firstly, consumers might be vary to provide more funding than absolutely necessary
in fear of fund embezzlement by the entrepreneur. By limiting demand to the
lowest possible level consumers therefore might try to mitigate this moral hazard
risk. Secondly, consumers might be reluctant to indicate high demand for the project
in anticipation of future sales. The entrepreneur might interpret high funding for
his project as a signal to change prices in an aftermarket compared to the CF. The
restriction of the funding to the minimum can therefore also be seen as a result of
consumer coordination to mitigate price risk. Thirdly, the clustering could also (at
least partly) be due to artificial demand boosts. Suppose an entrepreneur observes
a funding of 95 percent one hour before the funding period ends. Obviously, the
entrepreneur then has a very strong incentive to contribute own funds (or those of
friends and family) in order to reach 100 percent as the alternative would be a transfer
of zero due to the all-or-nothing property. Those ‘donations’ would then lead to a
clustering at the target level ‘from below’. Lastly, there may be other consumer level
reasons which increase the propensity to pledge once the funding goal approaches.
Consumers might interpret a higher P/T ratio as a positive quality signal, reassuring
them in their pledging decision. They might also feel more pivotal for P/T values
approaching one, while the pivotality naturally disappears once the funding goal is
reached.
In this project we want to shed light on the first two aspects and in particular on the
aspect of price risks. We analyze a two-period setting, where an entrepreneur raises
funds to cover setup costs through a reward based all-or-nothing CF campaign (period
1) and sells the good as a monopolist to all remaining consumers in the retail market in
case of a successful funding (period 2). The entrepreneur faces uncertainty regarding
demand, which is given by a continuum of differentiated consumers in an uncertain
market size. We characterize the price risk faced by consumers in anticipation of
future prices and show that consumers can be incentivized to participate in the CF
campaign by assuring price stability across periods. This is achieved by consumers
pledging up to some cutoff valuation, which induces the entrepreneur not to change
prices in the subsequent retail market. In particular we present an equilibrium
outcome where consumers pledge up to the target level whenever the demand state
permits, but never above. The target level in this case serves as a commitment
device to leave prices unchanged, eliminating the price concerns for consumers. This
is consistent with the price risk argument introduced above and provides a novel
explanation for the empirical observation of the clustering around the target level.
We also present a variety of robustness checks and show that the clustering at the
target level prevails if we change the source of uncertainty, the timing of consumer
arrivals, as well robustness with respect to moral hazard.
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3.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature on crowdfunding. Agrawal et al.
(2014) discuss the economic mechanisms at work associated with a CF scheme but
do not provide formal analysis. Similarly, Belleflamme et al. (2015) provide a very
helpful overview of the economics behind crowdfunding with a slight focus on the
platform aspect of crowdfunding providers.
One stream of the theoretical contributions focuses on the possibility to use CF
to price discriminate between consumers. Belleflamme et al. (2014) analyze the
trade-offs between reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding and analyze how
crowdfunding can be used to price discriminate between crowdfunders and non-
crowdfunders. In their model consumers obtain additional utility from playing an
active role in the funding period which we do not take into account. Even though
this effect certainly plays a role in some funding projects (niche markets, ’emotional’
products, etc.), we expect the effect to dissipate once the number of potential funders
becomes large. Ellman and Hurkens (2015) study the optimal CF design and find
that CF can be used to extract rents from high-valuation consumers when they are
pivotal for the success of a campaign. A similar argument is made in Kumar et al.
(2016) where a pivotality argument is used to force some consumers to pay a premium
compared to a future retail price. Our model differs from the two mentioned papers
as we consider continuous demand and therefore no individual consumer is pivotal for
the success of the campaign, as we expect pivotality to play a less crucial role once
the CF industry matures and becomes more accepted and popular. Also, Ellman
and Hurkens (2015) consider the presence of an aftermarket in an extension to their
main model but restrict the distribution of consumers, such that some consumers are
only available throughout the CF campaign, while other consumers are only available
in the aftermarket. This is in contrast to our paper, as we allow all consumers to
endogenously decide whether to participate in the CF or whether to wait for the retail
stage.
Another stream of literature analyzes the role of CF to overcome demand uncertainty
and to learn about underlining demand characteristics. In fact the survey by Mollick
and Kuppuswamy (2014) suggests that in more than 60 percent of CF campaigns
one consideration was to see whether there is demand for the product. Similarly, the
analysis by Viotto da Cruz (2018) suggests that CF is used to learn about potential
demand. Chemla and Tinn (2018) show that CF can improve investment decisions
as they provide information about the demand prior to making the investment. The
gathered information can then be used in subsequent sales decisions. However, in
their setting the distribution of consumers across periods is exogenously constrained.
In fact, they assume that only a fixed number of consumers has access to the
crowdfunding campaign. Strausz (2017) analyzes the problem from a mechanism
design perspective and argues that CF can help to screen for valuable projects
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as it only allows for project implementation in case of sufficiently high demand.
Additionally, the author argues that crowdfunding can help to overcome a moral
hazard problem by providing the entrepreneur only the necessary funds to cover
investment costs, while deferring remaining funds to a point in time after the
investment is sunk, discouraging fund embezzlement. The author argues that these
deferred payments arise naturally in a setting where the CF campaign is followed by
sales in a retail market, but does not model the aftermarket explicitly. Our results
suggest that consumers distribute endogenously across the CF and the retail period
and that the distribution of consumers can indeed incentivize an entrepreneur to
implement the investment project as long as the moral hazard risk is not too severe.
Chang (2016) also considers a two-period setup with a continuum of potential backers,
however the setting differs substantially as the author considers uncertainty regarding
the common value of the crowdfunded object.
Several papers focus on demand dynamics explicitly and try to provide explanations
for empirical findings. Alaei et al. (2016) analyze the pledging behavior in a setting
where consumers arrive sequentially to the market. They show that the success
probability of a CF campaign is bimodal such that campaigns are either very likely
to fail or very likely to succeed. On a similar note, unpublished work by Deb et
al. (2018) studies contribution dynamics where donations are taken into account.
The authors show that in the presence of donors the target level becomes flexible to
some extent, as any shortcoming towards the end of the campaign can be covered by
an endowed donor to make sure that the campaign succeeds. On the empirical side,
analysis by Mollick (2014) suggests that CF projects tend to either succeed by a small
margin or fail by a large margin, which is consistent with the illustration in figure
3.1. Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) argue that consumers are more likely to pledge
if they believe that their contribution will make an impact. The pledging propensity
therefore increases when the funding approaches the target level, and decreases once
the target is reached.45 We contribute to this stream of literature by providing a
novel explanation for the clustering around the target level, namely the mitigation of
price risk.
We would like to relate our work also to the broader literature on advance purchasing
and price setting of durable goods monopolists. The Coase conjecture (Coase,
1972) states that a durable good monopolist can not engage in intertemporal price
discrimination if consumers are forward looking. This aspect reappears in our
analysis, as in fact consumers in equilibrium are indifferent between pledging in the
CF campaign and waiting for the retail market. The difference, however, is that
the price setting in the retail period is adapted to information obtained throughout
the CF campaign, while at the same time the all-or-nothing property demands a
lower bound on revenue obtained in the CF campaign. Nocke and Peitz (2007) show
45We refer to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) for an overview of the literature in psychology and
experimental economics which supports the ‘goal gradient’ tendency.
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that in a two-period setting consumers with high valuation buy early at a higher
price while low valuation consumers wait for the price to drop (clearance sales).
However, the setting differs substantially as production is capacity constrained in
their model and consumers have a discrete type space (high and low). Nevertheless
our results correspond nicely to theirs, as in our setting high-value consumers buy
early in order to balance the learning effect a successful crowdfunding campaign would
have. Similarly, Möller and Watanabe (2010) show that if demand exceeds capacity,
clearance sales as well as advance purchase discounts can be optimal. Sahm (2015)
extends the advance purchase framework to a setting with continuous type space but
a discrete number of consumers. He shows that advance purchase pricing can be used
as a discriminatory device, however, the price difference between the two periods
disappears as the number of consumers becomes large, which is consistent with our
results.
3.3 Model
We consider a model with three groups of players (consumers, entrepreneur and CF
platform) being respectively involved in the financing, production and sales of an
innovative good. The game is separated into two periods. Period 1 refers to the CF
period which spans t ∈ [0, 1] while period 2 refers to the retail market, where sales to
the general public occur in case of a successful CF campaign, i.e. after t > 1.
3.3.1 Players
Consumers There is a continuum of consumers with total mass M(s). The total
massM(s) depends on an exogenous but stochastic demand state s ∈ S ≡ [0, 1] where
we assume M(s) = s ∀ s ∈ S, reflecting uncertainty regarding the total market size.
We denote the distribution of s as F (s) with F ′(s) = f(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S and assume for
tractability reasons that demand states are uniformly distributed such that F (s) = s.
Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the good and has a private valuation v ∈ V ≡
[0, 1] where v is distributed according to G(v) with G′(v) = g(v) > 0 ∀ v ∈ V such
that in every state s there is a full support of valuations v in the market.46 Further
we require the distribution of valuations to satisfy the following property.
Assumption 3.1 (Monotone hazard rate) The distribution of valuations G(v) is
twice continuously differentiable and exhibits a monotone hazard rate H ′(v) < 0 where
H(v) := 1−G(v)g(v) for all v ∈ V .
Let the one-shot revenue maximizing price be denoted as pM which is implicitly
defined by pM = H(pM ). Consumers are risk-neutral and have no time preference
(i.e. a discount rate of one) and obtain zero utility if they decide not to purchase the
46We consider an alternative uncertainty setup where the distribution of valuations depends on the
demand state in section 3.5.4.
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good. A consumer with valuation v then simply obtains a (net) utility of u = v − p
when purchasing the good at price p.
Entrepreneur There is one entrepreneur (E) with an innovative product idea. In
order to set up production of the good E faces publicly known investment costs of
I > 0. Once the initial investment is sunk, E can produce the good at marginal costs
of zero. We assume that E is money-less and relies on external financing in order to
cover investment cost. Also, suppose the good is sufficiently innovative such that E is
a monopolist once production is set up. We assume that E can not commit to period
2 prices during the CF stage. Also in the main model we ignore the possibility of
moral hazard, i.e. whenever E obtains the necessary funds to cover investment costs
she will do so.47
Crowdfunding platform We consider an entirely passive CF platform which
facilitates a reward-based, all-or-nothing CF mechanism ψ = (p1, T ), which is chosen
by E. The mechanism resembles popular CF services such as Kickstarter in a sense
that it requires every CF project to specify an individual pledge level p1 ≥ 0 and
a target level T ≥ I. We assume that the campaign length is fixed for a period of
length 1 and starts with the choice of ψ at t = 0.
If the sum of total pledges P exceeds the target level T the CF is successful, and the
pledge level P is transferred to the entrepreneur. The obligation of E in this case is
to make the necessary investment, to produce the good and to deliver the good to
all backers free of any additional charges. The initial individual pledge level p1 can
therefore be thought of as an advance purchase price, while the promised reward of
the CF campaign is one unit of the product itself. If the target level has not been
reached (P < T ) the CF is unsuccessful. Consumers in this case get their individual
pledge p1 back and E does not get any funds transferred (all-or-nothing, AoN). We
assume for simplicity that the CF platform provides its service free of charge.
3.3.2 Information structure and timing
We assume that consumers know their private value v while the distribution of
valuations, the distribution of demand states as well as the game structure are
common knowledge among all players. The realization of the demand state s ∈ S
is unobservable by all players and we assume that players update their beliefs in a
Bayesian sense whenever possible. The time structure of the game is depicted in the
following figure.
47In section 3.5.3 we discuss how introducing moral hazard affects the results. In particular we
consider the setting where instead of making the investment, E can decide to embezzle the transferred
funds.
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t < 0 t = 0 t = 1 t
Crowdfunding period Retail period
Demand state
s is realized.
E sets ψ = (p1, T )
Consumers observe ψ
and simultaneously decide
whether to pledge or to wait.
If P ≥ T :
E makes investment,
updates her belief about s
and chooses p2.
Remaining consumers decide
whether to buy at p2.
If P < T :




In this section we introduce notation and derive equilibrium conditions from the
consumers’ and the entrepreneur’s decision problems. We then characterize two
equilibrium outcomes, an uncoordinated equilibrium and a coordinated equilibrium.
In cases where we make use of the expectation operator, we take the expectation
with respect to the demand state. Parts of the analysis (Appendix 3.A.1) and proofs
(Appendix 3.A.2) are delegated to the appendix whenever they are not central to the
understanding of the paper.
3.4.1 Decision problems
Let ψ = (p1, T ) denote an arbitrary CF campaign. Reflecting the aggregate
uncertainty in the market we characterize demand using consumer specific pledging
probabilities such that b(p1|v, s) denotes the probability to pledge at price p1 of a
consumer with valuation v in demand state s. Further note that consumers do not
learn anything about the underlining demand state by just learning their valuation v
such that consumers and the entrepreneur share the common prior f(s).48
Consumers Consider the decision problem of a consumer with valuation v
whether to pledge or not for a given CF scheme ψ = (p1, T ). We start by deriving
demand states where the CF campaign is expected to be successful. For a given CF





The demand specification D1(p1|s) simply takes into account the pledging decisions
of consumers with sufficiently high valuation such that the total pledge level in state




= f(s) ∀ v ∈ V .
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s is given by
P (p1|s) = p1D1(p1|s). (3.2)
We can then define the set of demand states where the CF campaign is expected





denote the distribution of states conditional on the CF campaign
being successful. As individual consumers have zero mass, no consumer can be made
pivotal for the success of the CF campaign. The decision whether to pledge or not
is then given by the comparison of expected utilities. A consumer with v ≥ p1
will therefore strictly prefer participation in the CF campaign if E [u(′pledge′)] >
E [u(′wait′)] or explicitly
pis(v − p1) + (1− pis)0 > pis
(∫
s∈S
max {v − p2(p1|s), 0} f(s)ds
)
+ (1− pis)0 (3.3)
where pis := Pr(s ∈ S) ≡
∫
s∈S f(s)ds denotes the success probability, while p2(p1|s) :=
p∗2 (p1, P (p1|s)) denotes the anticipated retail price in case a pledge level P (p1|s) is
reached. The retail price setting will be introduced below in more detail. Note that
the comparison of expected utilities takes into account that in case of an unsuccessful
campaign, consumers are refunded if they pledged, while the retail stage also only
becomes relevant if the CF campaign succeeds. The considerations in the retail stage
then reflect the idea that no consumer can be forced to purchase the product if
the price exceeds the consumer’s valuation, as the consumer always has the outside
option to not buy the product at all. The comparison E [u(′pledge′)] R E [u(′wait′)]
for consumers v ≥ p1 reduces to
v − p1 R
∫
s∈S
max {v − p2(p1|s), 0} f(s)ds (3.4)
which highlights the price risk faced by consumers with valuation v ≥ p1, while
consumers with v < p1 will always wait, as they can only profit from waiting. For
consumers with valuations close to p1 the LHS of (3.4) is essentially zero, such that
consumers might benefit from waiting in case there are demand states where prices
would decrease. If prices increase they might not purchase the good at all, and obtain
a utility of zero. Consumers with high valuations compare a high net utility from
pledging at p1 to an uncertain surplus of waiting. In particular if prices increase
above p1, high valuation consumers might end up worse compared to pledging in the
CF campaign. For S 6= ∅ we therefore obtain the optimal pledging decision
b∗(p1|v) =

1 if E [u(′pledge′)] > E [u(′wait′)] and v ≥ p1
β ∈ [0, 1] if E [u(′pledge′)] = E [u(′wait′)] and v ≥ p1
0 if E [u(′pledge′)] < E [u(′wait′)] or v < p1.
(3.5)
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Consumers will therefore pledge if their valuation is sufficiently high and the expected
utility from securing the good in the retail stage is sufficiently low. They will wait
if their valuation is too low compared to current prices, or the expected utility from
waiting is sufficiently high. In case they are indifferent between pledging and waiting,
any pledging probability is individually rational.
Entrepreneur Starting in period 2 we can characterize the optimal pricing
decision in the retail market. Suppose the campaign has been successful such that E
observes some pledge level P ≥ T . This gives rise to an updated set of demand states
Sˆ := {s ∈ S|P (p1|s) = P} which are consistent with observing P , and a conditional




. Also for all s ∈ Sˆ we can
define residual demand in period 2 as
D2(p2|s, p1) = s
∫ 1
p2
(1− b(p1|s, v)) g(v)dv (3.6)
such that the retail profits are given by Π2(p2|s, p1) = p2D2(p2|s, p1) for s ∈
Sˆ while the profit maximization problem is given by maxp2 E[Π2(p2|s, p1)|P ] =∫
s∈Sˆ Π2(p2|s, p1)fˆ(s)ds. The optimal retail price is then given by
p∗2(p1, P ) = arg maxp2 E[Π2(p2|s, p1)|P ] (3.7)
which we assume to be unique at this point and verify in the subsequent analysis
that this is the case. Further, we define Π∗2(p1, P ) := E[Π2(p∗2(p1, P )|s, p1)|P ]. We
can now write ex-ante period 1 profits as
Π1(p1|s) =
P (p1|s)− I if s ∈ S0 else (3.8)
such that period 1 profits are given by the difference between the total money collected
in the CF campaign P (p1|s) and the investment costs I in case of a successful
campaign (s ∈ S). If the campaign is not successful (s /∈ S) the AoN property





2(p1, P (p1|s)) if s ∈ S
0 else
(3.9)
as the retail stage is only relevant in case of a successful CF campaign. Lastly, we
require the CF scheme to be ex-ante optimal such that
ψ∗ = arg max
ψ
E [Π1(p1|s) + Π2(p1|s)] s.t. T ≥ I (3.10)
where T ≥ I simply denotes the feasibility constraint.
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Equilibrium considerations Equations (3.5), (3.7) and (3.10) are optimality
conditions which have to be satisfied in equilibrium. They require sequential
rationality by the entrepreneur whenever period 2 is reached, as well as ex-ante
optimal behavior by the entrepreneur and consumers given the common prior
belief.
Inequality (3.4) illustrates the price risk faced by consumers which is the key obstacle
to overcome for defining equilibrium demand. We therefore introduce the following
preliminary considerations to motivate the construction of our presented equilibrium
outcomes.
Proposition 3.1 There can not exist an equilibrium in which a CF campaign ψ =
(p1, T ) implements an investment project I > 0 in states s ∈ S if consumers with
v ≥ p1 strictly prefer waiting over pledging, or if consumers with v ≥ p1 strictly
prefer pledging over waiting.
Proof. The following constitutes a proof by contradiction. Suppose there is an
equilibrium where consumers are not indifferent. If all consumers v ≥ p1 prefer
waiting, total demand in period 1 is zero, such that a project with investment cost
I > 0 can not be implemented. A contradiction. Now suppose that all consumers
with v ≥ p1 prefer to pledge. This implies that there is no consumer left with
valuation v ≥ p1 in period 2, such that the profit maximizing retail price must be
below p1. Hence, consumers would be better off by waiting instead of pledging, a
contradiction.
To gain intuition for this result ignore the demand uncertainty and suppose I is very
small. Now consider the two extreme cases where for a given p1 demand is either very
low or very high. If demand is high most consumers with v ≥ p1 are not available in
the retail period anymore as they purchased the product in the CF period, resulting
in retail prices below p1. If demand is very low, on the other hand, E faces essentially
the one-shot monopoly problem in period 2. This gives rise to a further intermediary
thought.
Lemma 3.1 There can not exist an equilibrium in which a CF campaign ψ = (p1, T )
implements an investment project I > 0 in states s ∈ S if p1 ≥ pM .
Proof. See Appendix.
Given Lemma 3.1 we continue our analysis with the implicit assumption p1 < pM and
continue with our equilibrium considerations. Proposition 3.1 remains silent about
the case where consumers with v ≥ p1 are indifferent between pledging and waiting.
One straight forward way to achieve this, is to establish price stability across periods,
i.e. once a CF price p1 is chosen, the retail price must not change in case of a
successful campaign. This completely eliminates the price risk faced by consumers
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and therefore in particular renders consumers with v ≥ p1 indifferent. As we assume
no price commitment by the entrepreneur regarding retail prices prior to period 2,
this has to be achieved by adequate distribution of demand across the two periods.
This is the key idea behind our proposed equilibrium outcomes and is summarized in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Stability condition) There exist price-stable equilibria in which a
CF campaign ψ = (p1, T ) implements an investment project I > 0 in states s ∈ S,
where prices remain unchanged in case of successful CF campaign such that
p2(p1|s) = p1 ∀ s ∈ S, (3.11)
rendering all consumers with v ≥ p1 indifferent between pledging and waiting.
The existence of such equilibria is demonstrated in the following sections. We will
refer to Proposition 3.2 as ‘stability condition’ throughout the subsequent analysis,
as the condition will play a crucial role in defining demand in more detail and in
the construction of the presented equilibrium outcomes. In the following we present
two equilibrium outcomes: an uncoordinated and a coordinated equilibrium, both
satisfying the stability condition and allowing for implementation of the investment
project.
3.4.2 Uncoordinated equilibrium
In absence of any coordination device consumer decisions can not coordinate on
a specific demand level in the CF period. Suppose that pledging decisions are
characterized by a cutoff valuation v(p1) such that
b(p1|v, s) =
1 if v ≥ v(p1) ≥ p10 else (3.12)
for all states s ∈ S such that for a given p1 only consumers with valuation v ≥ v(p1)
pledge, while consumers with p1 ≤ v < v(p1) refrain from pledging, resulting in
period 1 demand of D1(p1|s) = s(1 − G(v(p1)).49 Now suppose P ≥ T . Observing
P is then perfectly informative about the underlining demand state as then P =
sp1(1−G(v(p1)) such that Sˆ is a singleton containing only the true demand state s.
Residual demand in period 2 is then given by
D2(p2|s, p1) = max {s (G(v(p1))−G(p2)) , 0} , (3.13)
49Note that this resembles a rationing rule as not all consumers with v ≥ p1 are served in period 1
but only consumers with high valuations v ≥ v(p1). This ‘efficient’ rationing is discussed at a later
stage in more detail. In section 3.5.5 we demonstrate that in fact there can not exist a price-stable
equilibrium where the alternative rationing rule of ‘proportional rationing’ is applied such that all
consumers v ≥ p1 mix with a probability β ∈ (0, 1).
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resulting in the profit maximization problem
max
p2
E [Π2(p2|s, p1)|P ] = max
p2
p2D2(p2|s, p1). (3.14)





Note that the optimal retail price does not depend on the demand state s or the
total pledge level P such that we can denote the optimal retail price simply as p∗2(p1).
The stability condition for consumers in Proposition 3.2 is therefore only satisfied if
p∗2(p1) = p1. It is easy to verify that this is the case for
v(p1) = G−1 (G(p1) + p1g(p1)) (3.16)
as (3.15) then reduces to G(p∗2)+p∗2g(p∗2) = G(p1)+p1g(p1) which is only satisfied for
p∗2 = p1.50 Further, v(p1) is well defined for all p1 ∈ [0, pM ] such that v : [0, pM ] 7→
[0, 1] while we would have p∗2(p1) > p1 for cutoff valuations above v(p1) and p∗2(p1) <
p1 for cutoff valuations below v(p1).51 Also, we have v′(p1) > 0 for p1 ∈ [0, pM ] with
v(0) = 0 and v(pM ) = 1.
To gain intuition for v(p1) first ignore the term p1g(p1) such that v(p1) =
G−1(G(p1)) = p1. Then all consumers with v ≥ p1 would pledge, resulting in a
profit maximizing retail price strictly below p1. Hence, to push p∗2 towards p1, we
need to make consumers with valuations v > p1 available in the retail period, which
is done by increasing the cutoff valuation above p1. By adding the term p1g(p1) the
cutoff valuation is increased precisely to the extent that the monopoly price facing
the residual demand p∗2 is equal to p1.
Turning to the consumer decisions and recalling P (p1|s) = p1D(p1|s) we obtain the
set of success states S = {s ∈ S|P (p1|s) ≥ T} ≡ [s, 1] as P (p1|s) is increasing in s,
while the lowest success state s is defined by the state where the target level is barely




p1 (1−G(v(p1))) , 1
}
. (3.17)
We immediately see that the stability condition is satisfied as then p2(p1|s) = p∗2(p1) =
p1 ∀ s ∈ S such that in particular b∗(p1|v) = b(p1|v, s) is optimal. Total expected
50This is a direct implication of the monotonicity result established in Lemma 3.4 in Appendix
3.A.1.
51To see this note that trivially G(p1) + p1g(p1) ≥ 0 while G(p1) + p1g(p1) ≤ 1 can be rearranged
to p1 ≤ H(p1) which is satisfied for all p1 ≤ pM . For the inequalities note that for v → 1 we have
p∗2 → pM , while for v → 0 we have p∗2 → 0.
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profit is then given by
E [Π1(p1|s) + Π2(p1|s)] =
∫ 1
0













2(1 + s)p1(1−G(p1))− I
]
= (1− F (s))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Success probability
[E[s|s ≥ s]p1(1−G(p1))− I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit in case of success
(3.18)
such that the ex-ante profit maximization program can be written as
max
ψ=(p1,T )
(1− F (s)) [E[s|s ≥ s]p1(1−G(p1))− I] s.t. T ≥ I. (3.19)
We can immediately see that the feasibility constraint T ≥ I is binding as rearranging






which is satisfied as we have LHS ≤ 1 due to the feasibility constraint, while RHS > 1
for all p1 ∈ (0, pM ). Also, we indeed obtain p∗1 ∈ (0, pM ) as the success probability
approaches zero for p1 → pM .
3.4.3 Coordinated equilibrium
Going back to figure 3.1, we see that the uncoordinated outcome presented in section
3.4.2 fails to explain the clustering around P/T = 1. We would therefore like to
analyze in the following whether we can explain this pattern by equilibrium pledging
behavior if consumers are able to coordinate on a certain pledge level. In particular,
suppose that demand is such that the target level T is reached whenever possible and
demand is rationed (efficiently) if potential demand in a given state would exceed the
target level. We discuss how this type of coordination might occur at a later point
in this section. Demand is then characterized by state dependent cutoff valuations







if s ≥ s
p1 else
(3.21)
while s = min {T/ (p1(1−G(p1))) , 1}. The idea behind this pledging pattern is that
consumers pledge until the target level is reached, irrespective of the demand state. If
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potential demand would exceed the target level T , demand is rationed ‘efficiently’ in
the sense that only consumers with high valuations pledge in order to reach the target
level.52 Note that if the stability condition holds, the applied rationing rule does not
‘harm’ consumers, as all consumers with v ≥ p1 are indifferent, and are eventually
served at p1 in case of a successful campaign. The suggested rationing then merely
allocates demand across periods. From a technical point of view the main difference
to the setup in section 3.4.2 is that the cutoff valuation is now state-dependent. Note
that ∂v(p1|s)/∂s > 0 while v(p1|s) ≥ p1 and v(p1|s) = p1 by construction.
Suppose the CF campaign has been successful, i.e. the total pledge level P = T has
been reached. From observing the total amount T the entrepreneur can no longer
perfectly infer which valuations have left the market. In particular, observing T is
then consistent with state dependent period 1 demand
D1(p1|s) = s (1−G(v(p1|s))) (3.22)
for all states s in Sˆ = {s ∈ S|P (p1|s) = T} ≡ [s, 1] = S. In state s all consumers
with valuation v ≥ p1 must have pledged in order to reach T . In states s > s the
total pledge level T was a result of ‘rationing’ behavior such that only consumers with
valuations v ≥ v(p1|s) have pledged while consumers with valuation p1 ≤ v < v(p1|s)
refrained from pledging. Residual demand is then given by
D2(p2|s, p1) = max {s (G(v(p1|s))−G(p2)) , 0} . (3.23)
such that the maximization problem in period 2 after observing a total pledge level
T can be written as
max
p2




The profit maximizing retail price p∗2(p1, T ) then exhibits the following
characteristics.
Lemma 3.2 The profit maximizing retail price p∗2(p1, T ) satisfies
p∗2(p1, T ) > p1 for T < T ∗, (3.25)
p∗2(p1, T ) < p1 for T > T ∗, (3.26)
p∗2(p1, T ) = p1 for T = T ∗ (3.27)
where
T ∗ = p1(1−G(p1))1−G(p1)− p1g(p1)1−G(p1) + p1g(p1) . (3.28)
52In section 3.5.5 we demonstrate that there can not exist a price-stable equilibrium with the
alternative of a ‘proportional’ rationing rule.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3.2 demonstrates how the total pledge level translates into informational
updating regarding the optimal price setting in the retail period. If E would observe
P = T < T ∗ she would believe that there are still enough consumers with sufficiently
high valuation in the market such that prices can be profitably increased to p∗2 > p1.
Similarly, observing P = T > T ∗ would induce E to believe that too many consumers
with high valuations pledged during the CF campaign, such that the profit maximizing
strategy is now to offer the product at lower prices in the retail stage (p∗2 < p1). If,
however, E observes a total pledge level of P = T = T ∗, the profit maximizing
strategy is precisely not to change prices, i.e. the expected residual demand is such
that some consumers with very high valuations left the market, but the mass of
consumers with v ≥ p1 is still sufficiently high such that it is optimal to not reduce
prices in the retail stage. Figure 3.3 depicts the profit maximization problem for
different total pledge levels. We see that the pledge level essentially scales the expected
Figure 3.3: Period 2 profit maximization problem
The figure illustrates the period 2 profit maximization problem for the specification
G(v) = v, p1 = 0.1 and varying levels of T . Investment costs I are assumed to be sufficiently
low such that the CF campaign is successful in all depicted scenarios.
period 2 profit and thereby shifts the profit maximizing price outwards. For T = T ∗
the expected period 2 profit is scaled in a way that the profit maximizing price exactly
coincides with p1.
We can interpret Lemma 3.2 also from a consumer perspective. As long as the total
pledge level is below T ∗, the profit maximizing retail price is above p1, which means
that consumers have a strong incentive to pledge during the CF campaign as long as
T ∗ has not been reached yet. Once T ∗ has been reached, consumers have no incentive
to continue pledging, as increasing the total pledge level above T ∗ would result in
low retail prices, i.e. the ‘last’ pledgers would have been better off by waiting instead
of pledging. If the total pledge level is exactly T ∗ no consumer has an incentive to
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deviate, as prices in both periods are the same. It is clear that for a given p1 a target
level T = T ∗ satisfies the stability condition as then p∗2(p1, T ∗) = p1 ∀ s ∈ S.
The problem is that even though all consumers with v ≥ p1 are indifferent, the
existence of this equilibrium depends on state dependent consumer strategies. Since
the demand state is unknown to consumers, we argue in the following how this type
of coordination might occur. The coordination requires that 1) the target is reached
whenever possible and 2) in case potential demand would exceed T ∗ the rationing
rule is applied, such that only consumers with the highest valuations pledge. If
such a coordination possibility exists, then the individual pledging decision b∗(p1|v)
is consistent with aggregate pledging probabilities b(p1|v, s) as individual consumers
are indifferent such that any probability β ∈ [0, 1] is optimal. The coordination then
allocates ‘appropriate’ probability values (either 0 or 1) in order to reach the target
level.
The first point is consistent with the concept of ‘payoff dominance’ (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988) as it guarantees implementation of the project whenever possible and
excludes the possibility of project failing due to indifferent consumers.53. Another
justification for this point would be that being part of the group of backers has
some intrinsic value to consumers, breaking the indifference in favor of pledging (see
e.g. Belleflamme et al. 2014). Lastly, the target level acts as a focal point easing
coordination.
The second point reflects the efficient rationing assumption from the literature on
pricing and competition under capacity constraints (see e.g. Kreps and Scheinkman,
1983) where even though multiple consumers would be able to buy a product, the good
is allocated to the consumer with the highest valuation. One interpretation in the
CF setting would be that consumers with high valuation are more likely to pledge, as
they become aware of the CF campaign earlier than consumers with low valuations.
Once a sufficient amount of high valuation consumers have pledged, low valuation
consumers no longer find it optimal to do so. This idea already hints at a notion of
sequentiality. In section 3.5.2 we take the sequentiality argument more serious and
demonstrate that the outcome is equivalent to a situation where consumers indeed
arrive sequentially.54
We demonstrated that picking T = T ∗ induces indifference for all consumers with
v ≥ p1 and argued that the indifference facilitates implementation of the investment
project. For T 6= T ∗ this is no longer the case as reaching the target level in this
case would imply a price change.55 In fact one can interpret the choice T = T ∗ as a
commitment device as outlined in the following result.
53This argument is also applicable to the equilibrium outcome presented in section 3.4.2
54A setup with sequential arrival of consumers is also presented e.g. in Alaei et al. (2016) and
Strausz (2017). The difference to our sequentiality setting is that we make an assumption on the
order of arrival, whereas the previously mentioned papers consider i.i.d. draws. The motivation
behind this setup is discussed in section 3.5.2 in more detail.
55For T 6= T ∗ the equilibrium reasoning from section 3.4.2 can be applied.
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Proposition 3.3 By setting T = T ∗, E can pre-commit to not change prices in case
of a successful crowdfunding campaign.
This eliminates the price risk faced by consumers. In case the demand state is too low,
there is no risk in pledging due to the all-or-nothing property such that all pledges are
refunded. In case the demand state is sufficiently high, the target will be precisely
met such that it is sequentially rational for E not to change prices. We can now
analyze T ∗ as function of p1 in more detail.
Lemma 3.3 The equilibrium target level T ∗(p1) satisfies T ∗(0) = T ∗(pM ) = 0 and
T ∗(p1) > 0 for p1 ∈ (0, pM ).
Proof. See Appendix.
To gain intuition for this result recall how T ∗ was constructed. The target level T ∗ is
chosen in a way that E finds it optimal to subsequently not change prices. E would
pick p2 = pM if the entire support of valuations is still available, hence T ∗(pM ) = 0
with s = 0. Similarly, for p1 = 0 we have the degenerate case of T ∗(0) = 0 but s = 1
such that there is no state where period 2 is reached, hence p2 = 0 would be optimal
as well. For intermediate values p1 ∈ (0, pM ) we have T ∗(p1) > 0 and s ∈ (0, 1).
The actual choice of p1 and hence T ∗(p1) is determined by the financing needs of the




∗ − I if s ≥ s
0 else.
(3.29)
Using p2 = p∗2(p1, T ∗) = p1 we obtain after rearranging E[Π2(p2|s, p1)|T ∗] = E[s|s ≥
s]p1(1−G(p1))− T ∗ with E[s|s ≥ s] = (1 + s)/2, such that we can write the ex-ante
retail profits as
Π2(p1|s) =
E[s|s ≥ s]p1(1−G(p1))− T
∗(p1) if s ≥ s
0 else.
(3.30)
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The ex-ante profit maximization problem is then given by
max
p1














[E[s|s ≥ s]p1(1−G(p1))− I] ds
= max
p1
(1− F (s))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Success probability
[E[s|s ≥ s]p1(1−G(p1))− I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit in case of success
s.t. T ∗(p1) ≥ I (3.31)
To see that the constraint is binding note that the target function is increasing on p1 ∈
(0, pM ) such that (ignoring the feasibility constraint) expected profit is maximized
for the monopoly price.56 Recalling Lemma 3.3 we see T ∗(pM ) = 0, as the only
target level which would make it subsequently optimal to pick the monopoly price,
is precisely a total demand of zero in period 1, such that E would face the one-shot
monopoly problem in period 2. Obviously, this violates feasibility for any I > 0 such
that the constraint must be binding.
3.5 Discussion and robustness
We characterized two equilibrium outcomes satisfying the stability condition. The
uncoordinated equilibrium allows for arbitrary target levels and guarantees price
stability whenever the CF campaign is successful. The coordinated equilibrium
requires T = T ∗ and also guarantees price stability. In the uncoordinated
equilibrium the entrepreneur perfectly learns the demand state s, making the period
2 maximization problem deterministic. As the optimal retail price does not depend
on the demand state but only on the cutoff valuation, an appropriately chosen cutoff
valuation eliminates the price risk faced by consumers. In the coordinated equilibrium
E learns the demand state imperfectly, as observing a pledge level T ∗ is consistent
with multiple demand states. However, T ∗ is chosen in a way, that the retail price
which maximizes expected profits conditional on observing T ∗ is precisely equal to
p1. Figure 3.4 depicts simulated outcomes for both equilibrium types.
Comparing the coordinated outcome to the data illustrated in figure 3.1 we see
the occurrence of the clustering of pledge levels at the target level, while the
uncoordinated outcome shows a random distribution of total pledge levels. In the
following we would like to discuss which aspects might favor one equilibrium type
over the other and thereby also discuss robustness of our results.
56We refer to Appendix 3.A.1 for detailed derivations.
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Figure 3.4: Simulated equilibrium outcomes
Both figures depict equilibrium total pledge levels P (p∗1|s) for n = 100 draws of the demand
state s. The project size is held constant I = 0.08 and the distribution of valuations is
assumed to be uniform such that G(v) = v and g(v) = 1.
3.5.1 Efficiency
Note that even though the two equilibrium outcomes differ in terms of price
and demand dynamics, they share some efficiency properties. First of all, it is
straightforward to see that both equilibrium outcomes satisfy ex-post efficiency in
the sense that they allow to screen for demand states where it is ex-post efficient to
make the investment. This characteristic follows directly from the AoN property of
the CF mechanism, as it allows E to condition the investment decision on states of
the world where demand is proven to be high enough to cover investment costs. This
property is often seen as one of the major advantages of CF compared to other funding
sources. It is also easy to see that while both outcomes guarantee ex-post efficiency,
they are both not first-best allocations. A first best mechanism would implement the
project whenever consumer valuations are sufficiently high, which is the case in states









Note that this is clearly not attainable as we restrict the model to uniform prices.
Constraining the efficiency benchmark to uniform prices yields the second-best (or




∣∣∣spM (1−G(pM )) ≥ I } . (3.33)
Note that SSB ⊂ SFB and that pM is revenue maximizing irrespective of the demand
state. SSB is therefore the largest subset of SFB, attainable by uniform prices. Our
analysis showed however, that equilibrium prices will be below pM , which implies
that the presented equilibrium outcomes also come at a cost compared to the second
best. In a sense, this is an implication of the Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972). If
the good is durable, the sequential monopolist competes against its future self, which
limits the ability to raise prices in period 1. One way to overcome this ‘inefficiency’
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would be price commitment. If E could credibly commit to period 2 prices, second
best is attainable by setting p1 = pM , p2 > pM and T = I. However, it is unclear
to what extent entrepreneurs can credibly commit to retail prices throughout a CF
campaign. We would therefore like to stress that while the characterized equilibrium
outcomes are not optimal from an efficiency perspective, they still exhibit a screening
property (see e.g. Strausz, 2017), such that any investment decision made is ex-post
efficient.
3.5.2 Sequential pledging
In this section we consider an alternative timing to the game structure. Remember
the campaign length spans t = [0, 1], starting with the decision on ψ at t = 0 and
running up to t = 1. Now assume that consumers arrive sequentially in descending
order of valuation throughout the campaign length.
Assumption 3.2 (Sequential arrival) At time t ∈ [0, 1] consumers with valuation
v = 1− t enter the market and become aware of the CF campaign.
The idea behind this assumption is that not all consumers decide simultaneously
whether to participate in the CF or not. Typically, consumers become aware of
a CF campaign, read the project’s description, observe the current pledge level,
and then decide whether to pledge or not. Crucially, the assumption prescribes
that consumers with high valuations make their decision before consumers with low
valuations. This might be the case if e.g. consumers with very high valuation for a
product type (e.g. board games) actively search among ongoing CF campaigns for
new products (e.g. innovative board game concepts), whereas consumers with low
valuations might stumble upon the CF campaign throughout time. Alternatively,
high valuation consumers might be active in online communities (e.g. board game
forums) where the CF campaign was announced prior to the start, potentially even
by E herself, while low valuation consumers were not aware of the announcement,
and therefore become aware of the campaign at a later stage.
This changes the game to the extent that now consumers observe the current total
pledge level at the time they enter the market which we denote by Pt.57 Consumers
will therefore update their prior belief about demand states to a set Sˆv which contains
demand states consistent with observing Pt. The uncoordinated equilibrium is robust
to the sequential arrival of consumers as the decision whether to pledge or not just
depends on the consumers’ valuation v. However, we now verify that the characterized
coordinated equilibrium arises naturally as an uncoordinated equilibrium.
To see this note that the state dependent cutoff valuations presented in section 3.4.3
arise naturally if T = T ∗ and if consumers follow a simple decision rule: pledge if
Pt < T
∗ and v ≥ p1. The decision rule therefore prescribes consumers to pledge
57Note the equivalence of v = 1 − t in this setting, such that indices t and v are interchangeable
where it does not lead to confusion.
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only if their valuation is sufficiently high and the target level has not been reached.
The evolution of the total pledge level in different demand states throughout the CF
period is depicted in figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Sequential pledging
If the demand state is high (s > s) the target is reached quickly, while s = s denotes
the last demand state where the target is eventually reached. If the demand state is
low (s < s), the CF campaign entirely fails to reach the target level. We can now
verify that following this sequential pledging strategy is indeed optimal.
Starting with consumers v < p1 the pledging strategy prescribes to wait, which is
trivially satisfied. For v ≥ p1 we have to distinguish two cases. Let us start with
the case v ≥ p1 and Pt = T ∗. In this case it must be optimal for consumers to wait
according to the decision rule. This implies that the target has been reached at some
cutoff valuation v(p1|s) above v such that Sˆv = {s ∈ S|v(p1|s) > v}. As in this case
consumers know for sure that the CF campaign is successful and that prices remain
unchanged as long as the total pledge level does not rise above T ∗, consumers have
no incentive to pledge, i.e. waiting is optimal.
Let us now consider Pt < T ∗ and v ≥ p1 where the decision rule requires that it is
optimal to pledge. As the target has not been reached yet, it implies that the current
pledge level is the result of all consumers with valuations higher than v pledging
such that Sˆv = {s ∈ S|sp1
∫ 1
v g(w)dw = Pt}. Note that this is a singleton set which
includes only the true demand state. But then it is optimal to pledge as either s ∈ S
such that consumers know that the CF campaign is going to be successful (and future
consumers will stop pledging once T ∗ has been reached), or s /∈ S which implies that
consumers know that the campaign will fail, but due to the AoN property consumers
have nothing to lose from pledging. In both cases pledging is therefore optimal.
Hence, following the simple decision rule mentioned above is optimal which gives rise
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to the state dependent cutoff valuations from section 3.4.3.58
3.5.3 Moral hazard
So far we assumed that whenever E obtains sufficient funds to cover investment costs,
the investment is made. Now suppose that whenever E obtains a transfer P , she can
embezzle the transferred money instead of making the investment and keep a fraction
α ∈ [0, 1] of it. The parameter α then measures the extent of moral hazard, where a
low α implies that it is very costly to embezzle funds (e.g. high reputation or legal
costs), while a high α corresponds to a ‘wild west’ scenario, where there are basically
no repercussions in case of fraud. This setup resembles the moral hazard problem in
Strausz (2017).
Starting with the uncoordinated outcome we obtain the interim moral hazard
constraint
P (p1|s)− I + Π2(p1|s) ≥ αP (p1|s). (3.34)
Note that whether or not this constraint is satisfied, may depend on the realization
of the demand state s. In particular, the constraint might be satisfied for very high
states but be violated in low demand states if α is sufficiently large. To see this
consider the lowest success state s. As T = I in optimum, we obtain P (p1|s) = T = I
such that the constraint reduces to Π2(p1|s) ≥ αI. If the constraint is satisfied for s,
then it is also satisfied for s > s, as the LHS of (3.34) grows faster than the RHS (recall
that P (p1|s) and Π2(p1|s) are linear in s in the uncoordinated case). In this case the
presented analysis is valid and the outcome is robust to moral hazard. However, for
large α or I it is also possible that the constraint is violated for s = s but satisfied
for some high demand states s > s. In this case the presented analysis is no longer
valid, as consumers would face uncertainty about whether or not E will embezzle the
funds and are therefore no longer indifferent between pledging and waiting.
In the coordinated outcome we obtain the interim moral hazard constraint T ∗ − I +
E[Π2(p1|s)|s ≥ s] ≥ αT ∗. Recalling that T ∗ = I is binding in the optimum, we can
simplify the constraint to
E[Π2(p1|s)|s ≥ s] ≥ αT ∗. (3.35)
The constraint is very intuitive as it requires that expected sales from the retail stage
must exceed the payoff from running away. Hence, by limiting demand during the CF
campaign to T ∗ and deferring payments to the retail stage, the moral hazard problem
58Note that the sequential pledging is sub-game perfect, i.e. even if some consumers who were
supposed to pledge refrained from pledging, it is still optimal to pledge and ‘to fill the funding gap’
as long as v ≥ p1. The reason is that in this case only the success probability of the CF campaign
decreases while the mechanism behind Lemma 3.2 still applies. Also, there is nothing to gain by
pledging once the target has been reached. Hence, the sequential pledging strategy is sub-game
perfect.
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can be overcome (see Strausz, 2017), at least for low levels of α. The constraint
becomes more difficult to satisfy for large α and I. For large I the transfer T ∗ to E
also needs to be high in order to cover investment costs. This reduces the expected
payoff from retail sales, as a large chunk of demand is already served, while making
the outside option of running away with the money very attractive. The characterized
equilibrium outcome is therefore robust to moral hazard as long as the moral hazard
problem is not too severe.
3.5.4 Uncertain distribution of valuations
So far we considered the case of uncertainty regarding the total market size.
One important implication of this setup was that the distribution of valuations is
independent of the demand state. In the following we want to discuss how changes
to this assumption affect our results.
Consider a fixed total market size M = 1 with state dependent distribution of
valuations G(v|s) and g(v|s) = ∂G(v|s)/∂v > 0 ∀ v ∈ V, s ∈ S where the demand
state s orders the family of distributions G(v|s) in the spirit of first-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD), such that for two demand states s1, s2 ∈ S with s1 > s2 we have
G(v|s1) ≤ G(v|s2) ∀ v ∈ V . Now the demand state does not affect the total market
size any longer, but rather specifies to what extent consumers have high-valuations
for the product. A high demand state therefore indicates that high-valuations are
more common than in a low demand state. Before we characterize the equilibrium
conditions, we need to introduce an assumption which extends the concept of the
monotone hazard rate to this setting.
Assumption 3.3 (Regularity) The distribution G(v|s) is twice continuously
differentiable in v and s and exhibits
1. ∂H(v|s)/∂v < 0 for all v ∈ V, s ∈ S with H(v|s) := 1−G(v|s)g(v|s) ,
2. ∂H˜(v|s ≥ c)/∂v < 0 for all v ∈ V and s, c ∈ S with H˜(v|s ≥ c) :=
E[1−G(v|s)|s≥c]
E[g(v|s)|s≥c] .
This assumption is necessary to assure uniqueness of the optimal retail price. Also,
let p˜M therefore denote the one-shot revenue maximizing price which is implicitly
defined by p˜M = H˜
(
p˜M |s ≥ 0
)
. Note that the idea behind Lemma 3.1 must
still hold such that we can again implicitly assume p1 < p˜M , while we discuss
in the following to what extent the stability condition can still hold. Note that
now prior consumer beliefs about the demand state depend on their valuation v, as
f(s|v) = g(v|s)f(s)/ (∫s∈S g(v|s)f(s)ds). However, in case there is a demand schedule
satisfying the stability condition, consumers with v ≥ p1 are still indifferent between
pledging and waiting, as the heterogeneity in consumer beliefs only affects the success
probability of the campaign, while anticipated retail prices are still equal to p1 in each
success state.
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Uncoordinated equilibrium
It is easy to verify that the uncoordinated outcome can no longer yield stable prices.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium where consumers follow a cutoff strategy, such
that they pledge if v ≥ v(p1) and wait otherwise, as in section 3.4.2. If such
an equilibrium exists, then observing a successful CF campaign is again perfectly
informative (see section 3.4.2). This gives to rise to an optimal retail price p∗2(v(p1)|s)





and is unique under Assumption 3.3.1. We immediately see that while the optimal
retail price p∗2(v(p1)|s) is monotone in v(p1), it now depends on the demand state s.
This implies that if such an equilibrium exists, retail prices may fluctuate depending
on the outcome of the CF campaign. Hence, the stability condition can no longer
hold.
Coordinated equilibrium
While we can not provide close-form solutions of the ‘coordination target level’
T ∗(p1), we can nevertheless prove existence. For this we define state dependent
cutoff valuations v(p1|s) just as before, such that whenever the demand state permits
the target level T ∗ is reached.
Now suppose E observes a total pledge level of T ∗ resulting in an updated set of
states Sˆ = S ≡ [s, 1] where s : T = p1(1 − G(p1|s)).59 This results in an optimal
retail price p∗2(p1, T ∗) which is implicitly defined by
p∗2 =
E [G(v(p1|s)|s)−G(p∗2|s)|s ≥ s]
E [g(p∗2|s)|s ≥ s]
(3.37)
which is unique under Assumption 3.3.2. We can now ask the same question as before:
is there a level T ∗ such that it is sequentially rational for E not to change prices?
For T ∗ = T ≡ 0 the entrepreneur would choose p∗2 = p˜M > p1, while for the largest
possible T ∗ where even in the highest demand all consumers with v ≥ p1 would have
to pledge, i.e. T ∗ = T ≡ p1(1−G(p1|1)), we would clearly obtain p∗2 < p1. But then
we know from the intermediate value theorem that there exists some T ∗ ∈ (T , T )
such that p∗2(p1, T ∗) = p1 ∀ s ∈ S, which satisfies the stability condition outlined in
Proposition 3.2. Hence, the coordinated equilibrium exists if we consider uncertainty
regarding consumer valuations.
59The compactness of S follows from the FOSD property.
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3.5.5 Proportional rationing
The two presented equilibrium outcomes prescribe in case of indifference that
consumers with high valuations pledge instead of consumers with lower valuations.
We motivated this by drawing the analogy to the concept of efficient rationing. In
the following we demonstrate that in fact there can not exist price-stable equilibria if
we apply the alternative concept of ‘proportional rationing’, i.e. where all consumers
with v ≥ p1 pledge with a certain probability.
Uncoordinated equilibrium
Starting with the uncoordinated equilibrium we demonstrate that the stability
condition can not be satisfied if all consumers with v ≥ p1 mix with some probability
β ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there is such an equilibrium. Then observing a certain pledge
level is again perfectly informative as P = sp1
∫ 1
p1
βg(v)dv = sp1β(1 − G(p1)). The
residual demand in the retail period is then given by
D2(p2|s, p1) =
s (1− β(1−G(p1))−G(p2)) if p2 < p1s(1− β)(1−G(p2)) else (3.38)
such that marginal retail profits are given by
Π′2(p2|s.p1) =
s [1− β(1−G(p1))−G(p2)− p2g(p2)] if p2 < p1s [(1− β) (1−G(p2))− (1− β) p2g(p2)] if p2 > p1 (3.39)
while marginal profits are not defined for p2 = p1. A solution candidate β∗ would
therefore be given if the maximal retail profit is precisely reached in the ‘kink’ at
p2 = p1 in order to satisfy the stability condition. If there exists such a β∗ then
marginal profits have to be positive left of the kink
lim
p2→p−1
Π′2(p2|s, p1) = s [1− β∗(1−G(p1))−G(p1)− p1g(p1)] > 0
⇔ (1− β∗)H(p1) > p1 (3.40)
and negative right of the kink
lim
p2→p+1
Π′2(p2|s, p1) = s [(1− β∗) (1−G(p1))− (1− β∗) p1g(p1)] > 0
⇔ H(p1) < p1. (3.41)
It is easy to see that the first condition can be satisfied for low values of β < β ≡
1− p1/H(p1) while the second condition is violated for all p1 < pM . In combination
with Lemma 3.1 this implies that there can not be an equilibrium where all consumers
mix with a probability β ∈ (0, 1). This is depicted in the following graph where we
illustrate the retail profit maximization problem for varying levels of β.
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Figure 3.6: Retail profits under a proportional rationing rule
We immediately see that the incentive to decrease prices below p1 is given as long as
β > β. For β ≥ β this incentive disappears. However, we see that there is always an
incentive to increase prices above p1, irrespective of the level of β. In fact one can see
the link to the previous analysis if we consider the case p1 = pM . Then β = 0 would
yield p∗2 = pM , i.e. price stability. However, β = 0 implies that no consumer pledged
in the CF period.
Coordinated equilibrium
In the coordinated case we allow the rationing probability to be state dependent. In
particular let β(s) be the pledging probability necessary to reach a target level T such
that T = sp1β(1 − G(p1)) for all s ≥ s where s = T/(p1(1 − G(p1))) with β(s) = 1
and
β(s) = T
sp1(1−G(p1)) < 1 (3.42)
for s > s. The resulting period 2 demand is then given by
D2(p2|s, p1) =







if p2 < p1
s (s− s) (1−G(p2)) else
. (3.44)
It is straightforward to verify that the maximization problem maxp2 E[Π2(p2|s, p1)|s ≥
s] = maxp2
∫ 1
s p2D(p2|s, p1)f(s)ds is continuous but differentiable only for p2 6= p1.
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Nevertheless we can take a look at the marginal profits for p2 > p1 which are given
by





(s− s) (1−G(p2)− p2g(p2)) f(s)ds. (3.45)
Keeping in mind that Lemma 3.1 still holds such that p1 < pM , we immediately see
that marginal profits are positive for p2 ∈ (p1, pM ). The entrepreneur would therefore
have an incentive to increase prices above p1 for any p1 < pM and any T .60 This
implies that the stability condition can not be satisfied if we consider coordination
with respect to a proportional rationing probability and therefore there can not exist
an equilibrium if we apply the proportional rationing rule in this context.
3.6 Conclusion
We characterized equilibrium outcomes in a setting where a monopolist entrepreneur
raises funds through pre-selling her product in an all-or-nothing CF campaign, before
offering her product on a retail market to all remaining consumers. In order to
overcome the price risk faced by consumers, demand spreads across the CF and the
retail period in a way such that the entrepreneur finds it optimal to leave prices
unchanged once the CF is successfully completed. This is done by consumers with
high valuations pledging in the CF campaign, while consumers with low valuations
wait for the retail sales.
In particular, we characterized an equilibrium, where in light of demand uncertainty,
the funding target is reached whenever possible, but consumer demand never exceeds
the funding target, inducing the entrepreneur to leave prices unchanged. The target
level in this case acts as device to pre-commit not to change prices, eliminating the
price risk faced by consumers. This pledging pattern is consistent with empirical
observations where we observe that CF campaigns which are successful, are usually
successful only by a small margin, leading to a clustering of total pledge levels around
the target level.
We perform a variety of robustness checks to the presented equilibrium outcomes
and demonstrate that the characterized pledging pattern is robust to changes in the
timing of consumer arrival, the way how we model demand uncertainty, and moral
hazard, as long as the moral hazard problem is not too severe.
However, our model only explains certain aspects of the stylized facts of observed
funding patterns. The funding outcome of CF campaigns tends be bimodal with a
clustering of the funding ratio P/T around 1 and 0. While our model does provide an
explanation for the clustering around P/T = 1, it remains silent why only relatively
few projects fail with a funding rate close to one. Here, a richer model incorporating
60To see this rearrange 1−G(p2)− p2g(p2) > 0 to H(p2) > p2 which is satisfied for all p2 < pM .
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an entrepreneur who is not completely money-less could provide additional insights,
as the entrepreneur could then bridge the funding gap if the CF campaign is at risk
to fail by a close margin.
Also, we focus on equilibria exhibiting price stability. It would be interesting to
further explore whether, and to what extent, price fluctuations may arise in a CF
setting. This might be particularly interesting in a setting where the distribution of
valuations depends on the demand state, as suggested in section 3.5.4.
Lastly, it would also be interesting to investigate the intertemporal price dynamics of
CF campaigns with subsequent retail sales empirically. As a large share of successful
CF campaigns continues to operate as independent ventures after the CF has been
completed (see Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014), linking the price data to the CF
campaign might yield valuable insights.




The following Lemma introduces a technical result which is used throughout the
remaining analysis.
Lemma 3.4 For χ(v) := G(v) + vg(v) it holds χ′(v) = 2g(v) + vg′(v) > 0 for all
v < pM .
Proof. For g′(v) ≥ 0 the inequality is trivially satisfied. For g′(v) < 0 we know from
Assumption 3.1 H ′(v) < 0 or equivalently g′(v) > −g(v)2/(1 − G(v)). Replacing
g′(v) = −g(v)2/(1 − G(v)) in χ′(v) > 0 and rearranging yields H(v) > v/2 which is
satisfied for all v < pM .
Coordinated equilibrium
In the following we demonstrate that the target function of the ex-ante profit
maximization problem in (3.31) is increasing in p1. We start by introducing the
following interim result.
Lemma 3.5 Let T = T ∗(p1). The minimal success state s = T ∗(p1)/(p1(1−G(p1)))
is decreasing in p1 for p1 ∈ (0, pM ) such that ds/dp1 < 0.
Proof. First note that ds/dp1 < 0 reduces to −(1 − G(p1)) (g(p1) + p1g′(p1)) <
p1g(p1)2 which is trivially satisfied for g′(p1) ≥ 0 as we then have LHS < 0 and
RHS > 0. For g′(p1) < 0 we can rearrange the inequality to g(p1)/p1 + g′(p1) >
−g(p1)/H(p1). From Assumption 3.1 we have H ′(v) < 0 or equivalently g′(v) >
−g(v)/H(v) for all v ∈ V . Hence, the inequality is satisfied for g′(p1) < 0 as well,
concluding this proof.






2(1 + s)p1(1−G(p1))− I
]
s.t. T ∗(p1) ≥ I. (3.46)






[−sp1(1−G(p1)) + I] + 12(1− s
2)(1−G(p1)− p1g(p1)) > 0.
(3.47)
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To see why the inequality holds note that −sp1(1−G(p1)) + I ≤ 0 can be rearranged
to I ≤ sp1(1−G(p1)) or equivalently I ≤ T ∗(p1), which is the feasibility constraint.
Also, we know ds/dp1 < 0 from Lemma 3.5 while 12(1− s2)(1−G(p1)− p1g(p1)) > 0
for p1 < pM . Hence, the target function of the maximization problem in (3.31) is
increasing in p1.
3.A.2 Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Implementation of the investment project requires positive demand in period
1 which implies that some consumers with valuation v ≥ pM have left the market
in period 2, hence the profit maximizing period 2 price will be strictly below pM for
any positive demand in period 1. Hence, individual consumers would be better off to
wait instead of pledging.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. It turns out to be helpful to rewrite the maximization problem in (3.24) using
a piecewise-defined integral bound instead of the piecewise-defined integrand given
by the residual demand function D2(p2|s). We therefore consider the equivalent
maximization problem
E [Π2(p2|s)|T ] = E [Π2(p2|s)|s ≥ s] =
∫ 1
z(p2)




s if p2 ≤ p1
T
p1(1−G(p2)) if p1 < p2 ≤ p2
1 if p2 > p2
(3.49)
such that for p2 ≤ p1 we obtain the original maximization problem as in (3.24) while
for p1 < p2 we take into account the piecewise definition of D2(p2|s) by shifting
the lower integration bound upwards. The expression T/ (p1(1−G(p2))) is therefore
obtained by solving for the state z satisfying G(v(p1|z))−G(p2) = 0. Lastly, we need
to specify an upper bound such that even in the highest possible state (s = 1) no
consumers would be left to purchase the good, which is given by G(v(p1|1))−G(p2) =
0, or equivalently z(p2) = 1.
Applying Leibniz’s rule for differentiation to the maximization problem in (3.48)
yields after rearranging the first order condition
p∗2 =
E [s (G(v(p1|s))−G(p∗2)) |s ≥ z(p∗2)]
E [sg(p∗2)|s ≥ z(p∗2)]
(3.50)
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which implicitly defines the profit maximizing retail price p∗2. Note that (3.50) can





where z˜(p2) = E[s|s ≥ z(p2)] = (1+z(p2))/2. To prove that the solution p∗2 to (3.51) is
unique, we show that the RHS of (3.51) is strictly decreasing in p2. To ease notation
we define l(p2) := G(v(p1|z˜(p2))) = 1 − T/(p1z˜(p2)) such that dRHS/dp2 < 0 is
satisfied if
g(p2)(l′(p2)− g(p2))− (l(p2)−G(p2))g′(p2) < 0. (3.52)
As l′(p2) = 2 [T/ ((p1(1−G(p2)) + T )]2 g(p2) we can rewrite (3.52) as
−g(p2)2ξ − (l(p2)−G(p2))g′(p2) < 0 (3.53)
where ξ = 1 − 2(T/(p1(1 − G(p2)) + T )2 with ξ ∈ (0, 1).61 For g′(p2) ≥ 0 the
condition is trivially satisfied as ξ > 0 as well as l(p2) − G(p2) > 0 for p2 < p2. For
g′(p2) < 0 we obtain a lower bound on g′(p2) from Assumption 3.1 as H ′(v) < 0
implies −g(v)2/(1 − G(v)) < g′(v) ∀v ∈ V . Evaluating (3.53) at the lower bound
reduces to 0 < 1−T/(T + p1(1−G(p2))), which is true. Therefore, (3.53) is satisfied
also for g′(p2) < 0 which implies that the RHS of (3.51) (or equivalently (3.52)) is
strictly decreasing. Hence, the profit maximizing retail price is unique and satisfies
p∗2 ∈ (0, p2). Substituting T = T ∗ into the FOC then yields after rearranging
G(p∗2) + p∗2g(p∗2) = G(p1) + p1g(p1). (3.54)
From Lemma 3.4 we know that χ(v) = G(v) + vg(v) is a monotone function for
v < pM such that (3.54) is satisfied only for p∗2 = p1, which implies p∗2(p1, T ∗) = p1.
To prove the inequalities in Lemma 3.2 we show that dp∗2/dT |T=T ∗ < 0. We obtain




= ∂RHS/∂T1− ∂RHS/∂p2 (3.55)





= − (1−G(p1) + p1g(p1))
2
2p1(1−G(p1))2(2g(p1) + p1g′(p1)) . (3.56)
Note that we have (2g(p1) + p1g′(p1)) > 0 by Lemma 3.4 such that dp∗2/dT |T=T ∗ <
0.
61To see this note that ξ > 0 reduces to z(p2) < 1/(
√
2− 1) which is satisfied as z(p2) ≤ 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. We immediately see that for p1 = 0 one factor of T ∗ becomes zero. For p1 = pM
we can take a look at the numerator of the fraction (1−G(p1)−p1g(p1))/(1−G(p1)+
p1g(p1)), while the denominator is positive for all p1. To see that 1 − G(pM ) −
pMg(pM ) = 0 rearrange the terms to H(pM ) = pM which is the definition of pM .
For intermediate values of p1 the numerator is positive (as p1 < H(p1)) while the
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